Notice of Claim Later than 60 Days After Expiration is Too Late
Post 5089
Injury at Massage Causes Suit Against Therapist
Read the full article at https://lnkd.in/gziRzFV8, see the full video at https://lnkd.in/gF4aYrQ2 and at https://lnkd.in/gqShuGs9, and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 5050 posts.
Hiscox Insurance Company (“Hiscox”) moved the USDC to Dismiss a suit for failure to state a claim because the insured reported its claim more than 60 days after expiration of the policy.
In Mluxe Williamsburg, LLC v. Hiscox Insurance Company, Inc., et al., No. 4:25-cv-00002, United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division (May 22, 2025) the trial court’s judgment was affirmed.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, the operator of a massage spa franchise, entered into a commercial insurance agreement with Hiscox that provided liability insurance coverage from July 25, 2019, to July 25, 2020. On or about June 03, 2019, a customer alleged that one of Plaintiff’s employees engaged in tortious conduct, and the customer eventually sued on those allegations. Plaintiff made an insurance claim related to the incident, and Hiscox denied coverage.
According to the insurance contract Plaintiff was obligated to give Hiscox written notice of any claim “no later than 60 days after the end of the policy period.” In a letter denying Plaintiff’s claim, Hiscox explained that Plaintiff first reported the claim to Hiscox “on or about October 27, 2020 (94 days after policy expiration), [and therefore] the insuring agreement [was] not triggered and coverage under the Professional Liability Coverage Part [was] unfortunately precluded.”
Plaintiff sued asserting that Hiscox’s erroneous and vexatious refusal to provide coverage under the applicable policy, without cause or excuse, has cost Plaintiff significantly.
ANALYSIS
Hiscox argued the vexatious-refusal claim failed because Plaintiff did not allege that it satisfied its obligations under the applicable insurance agreement. More specifically, the insurance agreement required Plaintiff to notify Hiscox of its claim before September 23, 2020, and according to the Complaint, Plaintiff did not do so.
Because the insurance coverage was never triggered by timely notice, Hiscox argued that its refusal to pay cannot be considered vexatious under the facts alleged, and therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In response Hiscox contended that the purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. To withstand Hiscox’s Motion, Plaintiff’s Complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, which, when accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, states a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.
A vexatious-refusal claim ultimately requires Plaintiff to prove:
1. the existence of the insurance policy;
2. the insurance company’s refusal to pay; and
3. such refusal was without reasonable cause or excuse.
The Court concluded a vexatious-refusal claim requires an allegation that the insurer’s refusal to be “without reasonable cause or excuse.” This element requires Plaintiff to show that it upheld its end of the bargain as set forth in the insurance agreement. Failing to allege as much in the complaint provides grounds for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no allegation – general or otherwise – that Plaintiff complied with its obligations under the insurance contract at issue. A district court need not conjure up unpled allegations to save a complaint. Therefore, the Court granted Hiscox’s Motion to Dismiss.
The Court found for various other problems with the pleading and the withdrawal of Plaintiff’s counsel, that the better course is to dismiss this entire matter without prejudice. Doing so will allow Plaintiff sufficient time to find and retain new counsel, preserve Plaintiff’s ability to file a new complaint that sufficiently states a claim upon which relief can be granted, and give Plaintiff another opportunity to adequately serve all the defendants named therein.
ZALMA OPINION
Insurance law suits require a lawyer with knowledge of the minimal requirements of the law and the insurance contract. The complaint, as originally alleged, named a defendant who was not served, failed to allege a timely report of claim, and counsel withdrew before the motion was heard. By dismissing without prejudice the court gave the Plaintiff a second byte at the apple if it can find competent counsel to file a better suit. A trial court being kind to the Plaintiff.
(c) 2025 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc.
Please tell your friends and colleagues about this blog and the videos and let them subscribe to the blog and the videos.
Subscribe to my substack at https://barryzalma.substack.com/subscribe
Go to X @bzalma; Go to Barry Zalma videos at Rumble.com at https://rumble.com/account/content?type=all; Go to Barry Zalma on YouTube- https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCysiZklEtxZsSF9DfC0Expg; Go to the Insurance Claims Library – https://lnkd.in/gwEYk
Arsonist Tried To Represent Himself, Failed, and Sought Habeas Relief
Post number 5357
Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/he-who-acts-his-own-lawyer-has-idiot-client-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-d4bwc, See the full video at and at and at https://zalma.com/blog.
Karacson’s Arson for Profit Attempt Required Skill & Experience to Succeed
In Steve Ellis Karacson v. David Shaver, Warden, No. 25-1089, United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit (May 20, 2026) Steve Karacson was convicted in Michigan state court of arson and insurance fraud after evidence showed he burned his own insured home. Investigators found multiple points of origin, gasoline odor, and evidence tying him to the scene, including cell-phone location data and a receipt showing he had purchased a gas can and gloves shortly before the fire.
FACTS
Karacson initially had appointed counsel, but his relationships with both appointed attorneys ...
Foolish to Repeatedly Disobey Court Orders
All That Remains For Trial Is Plaintiff’s Damages On Each Of These Claims And Establishing Proximate Causation Of Those Damages.
Post number 5348
See the full video at and at and at https://zalma.com/blog plus 5300 posts.
In Linh Wang v. Esurance Insurance Company, No. C24-0447-JCC, United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle (May 1, 2026) John C. Coughenour, United States District Judge, found that throughout this case, culminating with its briefing on Plaintiff’s renewed motion and that Defendant has subjected Plaintiff to unnecessary motion practice for clearly discoverable information and made dubious representations (including to the Court).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case involves an underinsured/uninsured motorist insurance bad faith claim arising from a 2017 motor vehicle collision. The plaintiff, Linh Wang, alleges that Esurance Insurance ...
The Right to Negotiate with Insurer is Not an Assignment of Claims
Post number 5347
Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/ambiguous-contract-repair-assignment-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-2xppc, see the full video at https://rumble.com/v79is1s-ambiguous-contract-to-repair-not-an-assignment.html and at and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 5300 posts.
Nebraska Requires an Actual Assignment to Allow Contractor to Sue Insurer
In Millard Gutter Company, a corporation doing business as Millard Roofing and Gutter v. Farmers Mutual Insurance Company of Nebraska, also known as Farmers Mutual Insurance, also known as Farmers Mutual, No. A-24-818, Court of Appeals of Nebraska (May 5, 2026) Millard sued Farmers as an assignee of Jane Anzalone who had hired Millard Gutter to repair the roof of her home and agreed to allow Millard Gutter to coordinate with her insurer, Farmers Mutual, concerning reimbursement for repairs authorized under her insurance policy.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In ...
Qui Tam Case Without Evidence to Prove Fraud Fails
Post number 5369
Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/qui-tam-insurer-contended-defrauded-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-pgfgc and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 5550 posts.
In People Of The State Of California Ex Rel. Heath & Yuen, APC v. Silver Bird Auto Leasing, LLC et al., B342847, California Court of Appeals, Second District, Eighth Division (June 5, 2026) Heath & Yuen, APC defended parties in an automobile collision case involving a McLaren and a tour van. After that case settled for $25,000, the firm filed a qui tam action under California’s Insurance Frauds Prevention Act (IFPA) against Silver Bird Auto Leasing, LLC, X-Law Group, PC, and Filippo Marchino. The firm alleged three fraudulent acts in the underlying litigation:
1. the complaint falsely stated the McLaren was making a “legal turn,”
2. respondents produced a fraudulent repair bill/estimate, and
3. respondents failed to disclose Marchino’s GEICO insurance and its payment for repairs....
Full Faith and Credit Act Controlled
Read the full article at https://lnkd.in/evHXiiFE and at https://zalma.com/blog.
Posted on June 9, 2026 by Barry Zalma
Post number 5368
Posted on June 9, 2026 by Barry Zalma
In Prime Insurance Company, Inc. v. Medicab Transportation, LLC, Jason Rhodes, and Dale Johnson v. Prime Insurance Company, Inc and Prime Property & Casualty Insurance, Inc. No. 2:24-cv-421-SPC-KRH, United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division (June 3, 2026) Medicab, a paratransit company, bought two policies in 2021: a Business Auto Policy from PPCI and a Commercial Liability Policy from Prime. Both policies, as originally written, appeared to cover injuries arising from loading and unloading patients from Medicab vans.
After a patient, Margaret St. Aubin, fell while being unloaded from a van and suffered injuries, her Estate made a $1 million demand. Prime and its claims administrator concluded that the Commercial Policy’s loading/unloading language had been included by mutual mistake, because...
Full Faith and Credit Act Controlled
Read the full article at https://lnkd.in/evHXiiFE and at https://zalma.com/blog.
Posted on June 9, 2026 by Barry Zalma
Post number 5368
Posted on June 9, 2026 by Barry Zalma
In Prime Insurance Company, Inc. v. Medicab Transportation, LLC, Jason Rhodes, and Dale Johnson v. Prime Insurance Company, Inc and Prime Property & Casualty Insurance, Inc. No. 2:24-cv-421-SPC-KRH, United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division (June 3, 2026) Medicab, a paratransit company, bought two policies in 2021: a Business Auto Policy from PPCI and a Commercial Liability Policy from Prime. Both policies, as originally written, appeared to cover injuries arising from loading and unloading patients from Medicab vans.
After a patient, Margaret St. Aubin, fell while being unloaded from a van and suffered injuries, her Estate made a $1 million demand. Prime and its claims administrator concluded that the Commercial Policy’s loading/unloading language had been included by mutual mistake, because...
