Second Filing of Same Suit Precluded as Res Judicata
It Doesn’t Pay to Sue Twice
Post number 5379
Posted on June 24, 2026 by Barry Zalma
In Susan Cheung & another v. Thomas B. Puschak & another, No. 24-P-1451, Appeals Court of Massachusetts (June 12, 2026) the plaintiffs, Susan Cheung and Christopher Cheung, filed an initial complaint against Dr. Thomas Puschak and Carol Puschak in December 2022. The complaint alleged that Dr. Puschak committed malpractice, sexually assaulted the plaintiffs, attempted to poison Christopher, and engaged in insurance fraud.
The Superior Court ordered the plaintiffs to provide a more definite statement, and when they failed to comply, the first action was involuntarily dismissed in March 2023. The dismissal was with prejudice, and the plaintiffs did not appeal.
About six months later, the plaintiffs filed a second complaint asserting the same allegations against the same defendants. A second judge entered summary judgment for the defendants on res judicata grounds.
Law
Claim preclusion, or res judicata, bars relitigation of claims that were or could have been adjudicated in a prior proceeding where there has been a valid final judgment. Under Massachusetts law, claim preclusion requires three elements: identity or privity of the parties, identity of the cause of action, and a prior final judgment on the merits. A dismissal with prejudice under Mass. R. Civ. P. 41 (b) generally operates as an adjudication on the merits unless an exception applies or the judgment specifies otherwise.
Discussion / Analysis
The Appeals Court concluded that all three elements of claim preclusion were satisfied. The identity of the parties was not disputed because both actions involved the same plaintiffs and defendants. The causes of action were also identical because both complaints arose from the same alleged conduct: malpractice, sexual assault, attempted poisoning, and insurance fraud. Finally, the first action had ended in a dismissal with prejudice after the plaintiffs failed to comply with a court order requiring a more definite statement. Because Rule 41 (b) treats such a dismissal as an adjudication on the merits, and because no exception applied, the prior dismissal was a final judgment for claim preclusion purposes.
In the first matter, the plaintiffs argued, as they did in the second matter, that Dr. Puschak committed malpractice, sexually assaulted the plaintiffs, attempted to poison Christopher, and engaged in insurance fraud. The claims are identical.
Last, the Superior Court’s dismissal with prejudice of the first matter is a final judgment on the merits and satisfies the third element. Dismissal of a complaint, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, failure to join a necessary party, or improper damages, operates as an adjudication upon the merits unless either the dismissal is pursuant to statute or the judgment of dismissal specifies otherwise. None of those exceptions applies here, and thus the prior judgment operates as a final adjudication upon the merits.
Conclusion
The Appeals Court affirmed the summary judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs’ second lawsuit was barred by res judicata because it involved
ZALMA OPINION
Failure to provide a definite statement in a lawsuit resulting in dismissal with prejudice is a final judgement that precludes the same allegations again brings into play res judicata which defeats the new suit. If the plaintiffs were serious about their suit against Dr. Thomas Puschak they needed to comply with the original court orders. That failure caused a dismissal with prejudice to the original suit and the next try.
(c) 2026 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc.
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Insurance Expert May Not Testify to Speculative and Contains Unsupported Conclusions.
Posted on September 18, 2026 by Barry Zalma
See the full video at and at https://rumble.com/v7fmifw-expert-may-only-testify-to-what-experience-supports.html
In Michele A. Over, and The Estate Of Paul R. Over v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, and State Farm Fire And Casualty Company, Civil Action No. 23-cv-02243-PAB-STV, United States District Court, D. Colorado (September 14, 2026) Michele and Paul Over sued State Farm Fire and State Farm Auto over hail-damage and stolen-vehicle claims.
The operative dispute concerned State Farm Auto’s motion to exclude or limit opinions from plaintiffs’ insurance-industry expert, Aaron Castillo. Castillo.
Law
The proponent of expert testimony must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that an expert is qualified and that the opinions are helpful, sufficiently grounded, and reliably derived and applied. Experience-based opinions must explain how the...
150 Months in Prison for Tax Fraud
Post 4846
Posted on September 17, 2026 by Barry Zalma
See the full video at https://lnkd.in/g8rh3JBX and https://lnkd.in/gmkdy-9C, In United States Of America v. Thomas Addaquay, Nos. 25-10609, 25-10611, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit (September 9, 2026) the Eleventh Circuit affirmed all challenged convictions, the 150-month aggregate sentence, and the challenged $4,123,474.55 restitution award.
FACTS
In United States Of America v. Thomas Addaquay, United States Of America v. Thomas Addaquay, Nos. 25-10609, 25-10611, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit (September 9, 2026) the Eleventh Circuit affirmed all challenged convictions, the 150-month aggregate sentence, and the challenged $4,123,474.55 restitution award.
FACTS
Thomas Addaquay controlled United Consolidated Accounting and Business Services (UC), nominally a check-cashing business.
The government proved a three-stage tax-refund scheme that converted the resulting refund checks into usable funds through ...
Major Fraud Perpetrator Asserts Fifth Amendment Privilege to Avoid Prosecution
Post 5489
Posted on September 14, 2026 by Barry Zalma
Fraudster Refuses to Answer Questions About His Alleged Fraud
See the full video at https://lnkd.in/gvicAMDr and at https://lnkd.in/gvicAMDr
In Great American Insurance Co. v. Gemstone Property Management, LLC, et al., No. 23-cv-9100 (LJL), United States District Court, S.D. New York (September 8, 2026) Great American Insurance Company alleged that it was defrauded through a scheme in which Subin Associates, LLP recruited individuals to stage construction-site injuries, arranged unnecessary medical treatment and litigation funding, and pursued fraudulent personal-injury claims.
Luis Manuel Garcia Salcedo, resulted in a $6 million settlement. Non-party Jose Hernandez allegedly worked as an assistant manager at Subin, operated Hernandez Associates, and owned litigation-funding companies that shared office space with Subin and provided services to its clients.
After Great American ...
Is Exhaustion Required to Seek Declaratory Relief From an Excess Insurer?
Post 4578
Posted on November 9, 2026 by Barry Zalma
In Fox Paine & Company, LLC, et al. v. Twin City Fire Insurance Company et al., S287404, 593 P.3d 832, 593 P.3d 838, 346 Cal.Rptr.3d 541, Supreme Court of California, (July 27, 2026) the Supreme Court noted that Insurance is sometimes procured in a series of layers, with an insured acquiring a primary insurance policy that provides an initial layer of coverage for loss or liability and an excess insurance policy or policies that provide additional coverage in the event the underlying coverage is exhausted. Usually, the first layer of coverage must be exhausted before the excess layers are available to the insured.
Exhaustion
Fox and Paine’s investment-firm dispute generated extensive litigation and competing insurance claims. Their insurance tower consisted of a $10 million primary policy and four $10 million excess layers.
The Fox Parties alleged that insurers paid their rivals, withheld information,...
Payment of Fines & Completion of Probation Reinstates Right to Vote
Post 4576
Posted on November 5, 2026 by Barry Zalma
To Restore Voting Rights The Felon Must Pay Fines of $546.00
In Florida Supreme Court Mediator Ethics Advisory Committee, ETH F-26-377, No. F-26-377 (October 29, 2026) citizen unnamed and to Ron Desantis Governor, Cord Byrd the Secretary of State Florida Division of Elections provided an advisory opinion to a convicted felon about his right to vote:
To: [redacted] We received your request for an advisory opinion. You indicate that you have one or more felony convictions and request whether you are eligible to vote, including whether you have any outstanding legal financial obligations under section 98.0751, Florida Statutes, and, if so, a statement of the amount that must be paid to make you eligible to vote, and an explanation of how the amount was calculated.
The Division hereby responds to your request pursuant to its legal authority under section 106.23(2), Florida Statutes, and Florida ...
Administrative Review Permits the Agency to Apply its Expertise
Post 4574
In Erwin Jordan Castro Valdez v. Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, No. 26-cv-06147-BAS-JLB, United States District Court, S.D. California (October 30, 2026) Castro Valdez, a Cuban national paroled into the United States, was arrested on June 23, 2026, for alleged insurance fraud, grand theft, and making a false report to law enforcement. In his first habeas action, the district court ordered a bond hearing within fourteen days to determine whether the changed circumstances justified revoking his parole.
An Immigration Judge subsequently denied bond because of his pending state criminal case. Castro Valdez filed a second petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging that determination and requesting immediate release without first appealing to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
LAW
According to the supplied text, § 2241 does not expressly require administrative exhaustion, but courts impose exhaustion as a prudential requirement. ...
