Conditional Release Allows Supplemental Claims
Post 5238
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A Release Should Totally Resolve Dispute
In Harvey et al. v. Hall, No. A25A1774, Court of Appeals of Georgia, Fourth Division (December 3, 2025) Paul Harvey, an employee of Arthur J. Dovers (d/b/a 3D Mobile Home Services), drove a truck towing a trailer loaded with machinery and equipment. Harvey fell asleep, veered off the road, and crashed into a culvert, causing Lamar Hall serious injuries.
FACTS OF SETTLEMENT
On August 18, 2020, Hall signed a limited liability release under OCGA § 33-24-41.1, releasing Harvey, Dovers, and their insurer (Georgia Farm Bureau Insurance Company) from liability for the accident in exchange for $50,000, “except to the extent other insurance coverage is available which covers the claim.”
Dovers’s general liability insurer (Republic-Vanguard Insurance Company) denied coverage, citing a policy exclusion for bodily injuries from automobile use or entrustment. Dovers’s commercial auto insurer (Wesco Insurance Company) denied coverage, stating the truck was not a covered vehicle. Hall filed a personal injury suit against Harvey and Dovers, seeking over $557,000 in medical expenses.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Harvey and Dovers moved for summary judgment, arguing the release barred Hall’s claims absent evidence of other available insurance coverage. The trial court denied the motion via summary order without explanation. Harvey and Dovers appealed.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court erred in denying summary judgment, given the limited release and lack of evidence of other insurance coverage.
Limited Release under OCGA § 33-24-41.1:
A statutory mechanism allowing settlement with a tortfeasor’s liability insurer up to policy limits while preserving claims for underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits or other available coverage.
It releases the tortfeasor and settling insurer from personal liability but permits pursuit of judgment against the tortfeasor solely to access other insurance.
Affirmative Defense Burden:
Defendant must prima facie establish the defense (e.g., via the release document). The burden then shifts to plaintiff to produce evidence creating a jury issue (analogous to surviving a directed verdict). Failure to do so warrants summary judgment.
Application:
Appellants met their burden by submitting the release and insurers’ outright coverage denials. Hall produced no evidence (e.g., policy analysis or litigation against insurers) showing coverage under Wesco/Republic-Vanguard policies or elsewhere.
Rejection of Hall’s Arguments:
Denial letters do not “prove existence” of coverage; they affirm non-coverage. Hall could have litigated coverage against the insurers but did not, forfeiting the claim.
HOLDING
Harvey and Dovers were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, as Hall failed to produce evidence of available other insurance coverage to overcome the affirmative defense of release.
ZALMA OPINION
When an insurer settles a claim against an insured it will usually obtain a release from the claimant eliminating any further claims against the insured for the accident. In this case, the release allowed the plaintiff to sue the insured again to see if it could find further insurance available to pay Hall for his injuries. Hall tried and failed in an effort that could be avoided entirely if the release was not conditional literally encouraging litigation against the insured and its insurers.
(c) 2025 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc.
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Policy Limits Demand Accepted Settles Claim
Post 5434
Posted on August 26, 2026 by Barry Zalma
See the full video at https://lnkd.in/g-ZtsSgK and at https://lnkd.in/ghMBdYWR
A Contingent Offer Accepted Ends the Dispute
In Farmers Insurance Exchange, a California Reciprocal Insurance Exchange, The Superior Court For The County Of San Bernardino, Kathleen Ann Wood, E087128, California Court of Appeals, (July 9, 2026) Farmers Insurance Exchange insured Doyle Archer under an automobile policy with bodily injury limits of $15,000 per person and $30,000 per accident.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Archer rear-ended Kathleen Ann Wood at a red light, causing Wood to assert a bodily injury claim against him. Wood’s counsel sent Farmers a pre-litigation settlement demand offering to resolve Wood’s claim for the available policy limits, stating that if the $100,000 demand exceeded the policy, the offer was for the policy limits.
Farmers timely responded in writing, agreed to pay Wood the $15,000 per-person policy limit, and provided the requested ...
Policy Limits Demand Accepted Settles Claim
Post 5434
Posted on August 26, 2026 by Barry Zalma
See the full video at https://lnkd.in/g-ZtsSgK and at https://lnkd.in/ghMBdYWR
A Contingent Offer Accepted Ends the Dispute
In Farmers Insurance Exchange, a California Reciprocal Insurance Exchange, The Superior Court For The County Of San Bernardino, Kathleen Ann Wood, E087128, California Court of Appeals, (July 9, 2026) Farmers Insurance Exchange insured Doyle Archer under an automobile policy with bodily injury limits of $15,000 per person and $30,000 per accident.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Archer rear-ended Kathleen Ann Wood at a red light, causing Wood to assert a bodily injury claim against him. Wood’s counsel sent Farmers a pre-litigation settlement demand offering to resolve Wood’s claim for the available policy limits, stating that if the $100,000 demand exceeded the policy, the offer was for the policy limits.
Farmers timely responded in writing, agreed to pay Wood the $15,000 per-person policy limit, and provided the requested ...
The Largest Residential Burglary of All Time
Post 5407
Fraud & the Fear of Bad Faith Suits
Posted on July 22, 2026 by Barry Zalma
See the full video at https://lnkd.in/gWQQEySW and at https://lnkd.in/gyhdK6wv
This is a Fictionalized True Crime Story of Insurance Fraud explaining why Insurance Fraud is a “Heads I Win, Tails You Lose” situation for Insurers. The story is one of a collection designed to help to Understand How Insurance Fraud in America is Costing Everyone who Buys Insurance Thousands of Dollars Every year and Why Insurance Fraud is Safer and More Profitable for the Perpetrators than any Other Crime.
This is a Fictionalized True Crime Story of Insurance Fraud explaining why Insurance Fraud is a “Heads I Win, Tails You Lose” situation for Insurers. The story is one of a collection designed to help to Understand How Insurance Fraud in America is Costing Everyone who Buys Insurance Thousands of Dollars Every year and Why Insurance Fraud is Safer and More Profitable for the Perpetrators than any Other Crime.
After ...
Qui Tam Relators are not officers of the United States
Posted on September 4, 2026 by Barry Zalma
Attempt to use Constitution to Stop a Qui Tam False Claims Act Case
Post 5486
FCA’s Qui Tam Provisions do not Violate the Appointments Clause.
In United States Of America, Clarissa Zafirov, ex rel; Dr. v. Florida Medical Associates, LLC, d.b.a. Vipcare, Physician Partners, LLC, Anion Technologies, LLC, Freedom Health, Inc., Optimum Healthcare, Inc., Physician Partners Specialty Services, LLC, et al., No. 24-13581, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit (September 1, 2026).
The False Claims Act (“FCA”) allows the Attorney General to bring civil suits against perpetrators of fraud against the government. This case involves another portion of the FCA-the qui tam provisions-which allow people, called relators, who have knowledge about fraud against the government to pursue a case against the perpetrator of the fraud.
Dr. Clarissa Zafirov filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act on behalf of...
Posted on September 3, 2026 by Barry Zalma
You Only Get One Chance to Sue
Post 5484
In David Cromp v. Johnny Harkrider, Monique Harkrider, and their Marital Community, dba Able Plumbing Plus, No. 61678-5-II, Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2 (August 25, 2026) David Cromp hired Able Plumbing Plus in 2018 to install plumbing, including two toilets, at his residence. In 2019, both toilets allegedly leaked, causing damage. Insurance claims were submitted through Able’s contractor policy, but the insurer eventually denied the claims.
Cromp sued Able in 2022 for breach of contract based on the allegedly defective toilet installation. During that case, Cromp attempted to add claims related to Able’s conduct during the insurance claim process, including fraud, bad faith, tortious conduct, and bond-related claims, but the superior court denied leave to amend. The 2022 breach-of-contract claim was later dismissed with prejudice on summary judgment as time-barred.
On the same day the 2022 case was dismissed, Cromp filed a ...
Habeas Corpus Petition Granted
Post 5483
Posted on September 2, 2026 by Barry Zalma
Over Staying Visa & Charge of Insurance Fraud Still Entitled to Habeas Relief and a Bond Hearing
In Hernan Guillermo Palomino-Crespo v. Warden, Glades County Detention Center et al., No. 2:26-cv-02322-SPC-NPM, United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division (August 26, 2026) Hernan Guillermo Palomino-Crespo’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the government’s response and Palomino-Crespo’s reply.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Palomino-Crespo is a native and citizen of Colombia who lawfully entered the United States on a B-2 non-immigrant visa on February 24, 2017. He resides in Miami, Florida with his wife and two minor children, owns and operates a residential restoration and remodeling business, and files U.S. tax returns.
On June 4, 2026, the State of Florida charged Palomino-Crespo with insurance fraud.
Palomino-Crespo claimeds he did not meet the requirements for mandatory detention under § ...
