Officer Making U-Turn Chasing Criminal May be Immune if Not Done in Reckless Disregard for Safety of Others
Fact Finder Must Establish Basis for Immunity
Post 5236
See the video at https://rumble.com/v72gq5o-governmental-immunity-is-not-absolute.html and at https://youtu.be/CHlEX2ZCc4s and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 5200 posts.
In Robert Young v. Officer John Doe et al. No. 2025 CA 0527 (La. App. 1st Cir. November 22, 2025) Robert Young sued Sid J. Gautreaux, III, in his official capacity as Sheriff of East Baton Rouge Parish (the “Sheriff”), and multiple insurance companies. The Sheriff’s Office and an unnamed deputy were not part of the summary-judgment ruling on appeal.
Procedural Posture
The trial court granted Sheriff’s motion for summary judgment, dismissed all claims against the Sheriff with prejudice, holding that La. R.S. 32:24 immunity applied and that Deputy Miller’s conduct did not rise to reckless disregard/gross negligence.
Key Facts
On July 19, 2019, Highway 19 Deputy Kevin Miller (EBR Sheriff’s Office) was responding to assist in a foot pursuit of fleeing suspects; his emergency lights were activated; sirens had been on earlier but were off at the moment of the collision. The Deputy said he was traveling northbound and began a U-turn after the suspect ran past him. Young says the deputy was parked/stationary on the northbound shoulder, then abruptly pulled out and executed a U-turn directly in front of him without warning.
Young was traveling northbound in the inside (left) northbound lane at normal or reduced speed. Deputy Miller initiated a U-turn into the southbound lanes to pursue/block the suspect; the front of Young’s vehicle struck the passenger side of the deputy’s Tahoe. Young suffered shoulder/neck injuries requiring surgery.
Controlling Statute: La. R.S. 32:24 (Emergency Vehicle Privileges)
Subsections A–C grant privileges to emergency vehicles responding to calls or in pursuit provided audible/visual signals are used sufficient to warn motorists.
These privileges do not relieve the driver of the duty of due regard for the safety of others and do not protect the driver from the consequences of reckless disregard for the safety of others. Emergency-vehicle drivers are liable only for reckless disregard (defined by Louisiana courts as gross negligence), not ordinary negligence.
Legal Standards Applied by the Court of Appeals
Statutory immunity under La. R.S. 32:24 is an affirmative defense. The governmental defendant bears the initial burden. Immunity statutes are strictly construed against the party claiming immunity.
On summary judgment, all factual inferences and doubts are resolved against the mover and in favor of trial on the merits. Summary judgment is rarely appropriate when reasonableness, state of mind, or degree of care (ordinary vs. gross negligence/reckless disregard) are at issue, because those determinations usually require weighing evidence and credibility assessments.
Genuine Issues of Material Fact Identified by the Appellate Court
The appellate court found multiple disputed material facts that precluded summary judgment:
1. Whether Deputy Miller was moving northbound (straddling lanes) or parked/stationary on the shoulder immediately before initiating the U-turn.
2. Whether adequate visual or audible signals were used immediately before/during the U-turn maneuver sufficient to warn northbound traffic.
3. Conflicting descriptions of the overall scene (location of suspects, other officers, traffic, etc.).
Because the disputes went to the heart of whether the statutory privileges were properly invoked, and whether the deputy’s conduct rose to reckless disregard/gross negligence, the court held that the Sheriff failed to carry his burden.
CONCLUSION
The appellate court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. The resolution was based upon Louisiana’s emergency-vehicle immunity under La. R.S. 32:24 is not absolute.
When material facts are disputed about the driver’s position, the adequacy of warnings, and the overall circumstances of an abrupt maneuver (here, a U-turn across traffic), summary judgment on the reckless-disregard/gross-negligence exception is improper. The case must go to a fact-finder (jury or judge) to determine whether the deputy’s actions amounted to reckless disregard for the safety of others.
ZALMA OPINION
The insurance issues will be determined by the findings of the trial court whether the deputy’s actions were reckless disregard for the safety of others. If so, he and the Sheriff’s office will be found liable and if not, they can be found immune and the insurers may not be required to indemnify the defendants.
(c) 2025 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc.
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Arsonist Tried To Represent Himself, Failed, and Sought Habeas Relief
Post number 5357
Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/he-who-acts-his-own-lawyer-has-idiot-client-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-d4bwc, See the full video at and at and at https://zalma.com/blog.
Karacson’s Arson for Profit Attempt Required Skill & Experience to Succeed
In Steve Ellis Karacson v. David Shaver, Warden, No. 25-1089, United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit (May 20, 2026) Steve Karacson was convicted in Michigan state court of arson and insurance fraud after evidence showed he burned his own insured home. Investigators found multiple points of origin, gasoline odor, and evidence tying him to the scene, including cell-phone location data and a receipt showing he had purchased a gas can and gloves shortly before the fire.
FACTS
Karacson initially had appointed counsel, but his relationships with both appointed attorneys ...
Foolish to Repeatedly Disobey Court Orders
All That Remains For Trial Is Plaintiff’s Damages On Each Of These Claims And Establishing Proximate Causation Of Those Damages.
Post number 5348
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In Linh Wang v. Esurance Insurance Company, No. C24-0447-JCC, United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle (May 1, 2026) John C. Coughenour, United States District Judge, found that throughout this case, culminating with its briefing on Plaintiff’s renewed motion and that Defendant has subjected Plaintiff to unnecessary motion practice for clearly discoverable information and made dubious representations (including to the Court).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case involves an underinsured/uninsured motorist insurance bad faith claim arising from a 2017 motor vehicle collision. The plaintiff, Linh Wang, alleges that Esurance Insurance ...
The Right to Negotiate with Insurer is Not an Assignment of Claims
Post number 5347
Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/ambiguous-contract-repair-assignment-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-2xppc, see the full video at https://rumble.com/v79is1s-ambiguous-contract-to-repair-not-an-assignment.html and at and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 5300 posts.
Nebraska Requires an Actual Assignment to Allow Contractor to Sue Insurer
In Millard Gutter Company, a corporation doing business as Millard Roofing and Gutter v. Farmers Mutual Insurance Company of Nebraska, also known as Farmers Mutual Insurance, also known as Farmers Mutual, No. A-24-818, Court of Appeals of Nebraska (May 5, 2026) Millard sued Farmers as an assignee of Jane Anzalone who had hired Millard Gutter to repair the roof of her home and agreed to allow Millard Gutter to coordinate with her insurer, Farmers Mutual, concerning reimbursement for repairs authorized under her insurance policy.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In ...
Qui Tam Case Without Evidence to Prove Fraud Fails
Post number 5369
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In People Of The State Of California Ex Rel. Heath & Yuen, APC v. Silver Bird Auto Leasing, LLC et al., B342847, California Court of Appeals, Second District, Eighth Division (June 5, 2026) Heath & Yuen, APC defended parties in an automobile collision case involving a McLaren and a tour van. After that case settled for $25,000, the firm filed a qui tam action under California’s Insurance Frauds Prevention Act (IFPA) against Silver Bird Auto Leasing, LLC, X-Law Group, PC, and Filippo Marchino. The firm alleged three fraudulent acts in the underlying litigation:
1. the complaint falsely stated the McLaren was making a “legal turn,”
2. respondents produced a fraudulent repair bill/estimate, and
3. respondents failed to disclose Marchino’s GEICO insurance and its payment for repairs....
Full Faith and Credit Act Controlled
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Posted on June 9, 2026 by Barry Zalma
Post number 5368
Posted on June 9, 2026 by Barry Zalma
In Prime Insurance Company, Inc. v. Medicab Transportation, LLC, Jason Rhodes, and Dale Johnson v. Prime Insurance Company, Inc and Prime Property & Casualty Insurance, Inc. No. 2:24-cv-421-SPC-KRH, United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division (June 3, 2026) Medicab, a paratransit company, bought two policies in 2021: a Business Auto Policy from PPCI and a Commercial Liability Policy from Prime. Both policies, as originally written, appeared to cover injuries arising from loading and unloading patients from Medicab vans.
After a patient, Margaret St. Aubin, fell while being unloaded from a van and suffered injuries, her Estate made a $1 million demand. Prime and its claims administrator concluded that the Commercial Policy’s loading/unloading language had been included by mutual mistake, because...
Full Faith and Credit Act Controlled
Read the full article at https://lnkd.in/evHXiiFE and at https://zalma.com/blog.
Posted on June 9, 2026 by Barry Zalma
Post number 5368
Posted on June 9, 2026 by Barry Zalma
In Prime Insurance Company, Inc. v. Medicab Transportation, LLC, Jason Rhodes, and Dale Johnson v. Prime Insurance Company, Inc and Prime Property & Casualty Insurance, Inc. No. 2:24-cv-421-SPC-KRH, United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division (June 3, 2026) Medicab, a paratransit company, bought two policies in 2021: a Business Auto Policy from PPCI and a Commercial Liability Policy from Prime. Both policies, as originally written, appeared to cover injuries arising from loading and unloading patients from Medicab vans.
After a patient, Margaret St. Aubin, fell while being unloaded from a van and suffered injuries, her Estate made a $1 million demand. Prime and its claims administrator concluded that the Commercial Policy’s loading/unloading language had been included by mutual mistake, because...
