Lawyer Acquitted from Fraud Charges Sues Prosecutor & Insurer Who Reported Her
Post 5192
See the full video at https://rumble.com/v6z698a-acquittal-is-only-one-part-of-a-malicious-prosecution-action.html and at https://youtu.be/XOVL8CG6gv4, and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 5150 posts.
Probable Cause for Arrest Eliminates Claim of Malicious Prosecution
In Leslie Casaubon v. Texas Mutual Insurance Company and Donna R. Crosby, Travis County District Attorney, No. 1:19-CV-617-RP, United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Austin Division (September 12, 2025) Texas Mutual Insurance Company (“Texas Mutual”) and Donna R. Crosby’s (“Crosby”) (together, “Defendants”) moved to dismiss the suit filed by Leslie Casaubon.
BACKGROUND
Leslie Casaubon, a workers’ compensation attorney, who brought claims against Texas Mutual Insurance Company and Donna R. Crosby, a Travis County District Attorney. Casaubon alleged that Texas Mutual and Crosby conspired to bring false charges of insurance fraud against her due to her success in obtaining favorable decisions against Texas Mutual.
Defendants secured two grand jury indictments against Casaubon for insurance fraud, for which Casaubon alleges Crosby used false or misleading evidence. Casaubon was ultimately acquitted of all charges by a jury .
LEGAL FINDINGS
The court dismissed Casaubon’s claims against Crosby for false arrest, defamation, tortious interference, and conspiracy without prejudice. Crosby’s motion was denied as to Casaubon’s malicious prosecution claim and Section 1983 claim to the extent Crosby is not protected by immunity .
Casaubon’s claims against Texas Mutual for malicious prosecution, false arrest, tortious interference, and conspiracy were dismissed without prejudice. Texas Mutual’s motion was denied as to Casaubon’s defamation claim. The court found that Casaubon sufficiently alleged her defamation claim against Texas Mutual, but not against Crosby.
The court concluded that Casaubon failed to state a claim against Crosby for defamation as she did not identify any specific false statement Crosby made. The court found that Casaubon failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution against Texas Mutual as she did not plausibly allege that Texas Mutual initiated or procured her prosecution.
DISCUSSION
Immunity – Texas Mutual’s Immunity
As a threshold matter, Texas Mutual asserts it is entitled to immunity for its actions that give rise to Plaintiff s claims. Under Texas law, insurers must report suspected fraudulent activity and are “not liable in a civil action . . . and a civil action may not be brought . . ., for furnishing information relating to a suspected, anticipated, or completed fraud insurance act.” Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 701.052(a) (West). Further, Texas has specifically granted Texas Mutual immunity for “identifying or referring a person for investigation of or prosecution for a possible administrative violation or criminal offense.”
CROSBY’S IMMUNITY
Despite relying on sovereign immunity, Crosby opens her motion by observing that Plaintiff sues Crosby, presumably in her individual capacity only. As Crosby interprets Plaintiff’s state-law torts to be against Crosby in her individual capacity, sovereign immunity does not apply.
Crosby argued Plaintiff must satisfy Rule 9’s requirement of pleading with particularity Plaintiff alleges Crosby intentionally presented false evidence to the grand juries. An allegation that misleading and fabricated evidence was presented to the grand jury is a serious charge, and if properly pleaded, could state an actionable wrong if the Defendants knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth presented false evidence to the grand jury. Crosby argues Plaintiff fails to plead the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the alleged fraud because Plaintiff does not specify any particular statements made or proffered by Crosby or explain why they were fraudulent.” The Court agreed that Plaintiff failed to identify the allegedly false evidence Crosby presented to the grand juries or explain why it was indeed false. Plaintiff failed to plead with particularity the allegedly false evidence before the grand juries.
Against Texas Mutual, the Court found Plaintiff fails to state a claim for malicious prosecution, false arrest, tortious interference, and conspiracy, but succeeds in stating her claim for defamation. Against Crosby, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for false arrest, tortious interference, conspiracy, and defamation.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
Crosby and the grand juries’ roles in initiating and procuring Plaintiff’s prosecution was left to both Crosby and two grand juries after Texas Mutual reported Plaintiff. Because a person is not liable for merely aiding or cooperating in causing a criminal prosecution the Court found Plaintiff failed to state a claim against Texas Mutual for malicious prosecution.
FALSE ARREST
To sufficiently state a claim for false arrest, Plaintiff must show her arrest was made without authority of law. Because Plaintiff was arrested following her indictment, there was probable cause for her arrest, meaning her arrest was not made without authority of law. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims for false arrest against Texas Mutual and Crosby were dismissed.
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Defendants’ actions, clients of her workers’ compensation practice terminated their contracts with her. The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s tortious interference claims against Texas Mutual and Crosby.
DEFAMATION
Finally, the Court found Plaintiff sufficiently alleged her defamation claim against Texas Mutual, but not against Crosby. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff stated a claim against Texas Mutual for defamation.
Plaintiff failed to state a claim against Crosby for defamation. Plaintiff vaguely alleged Crosby’s entire prosecution of her was defamatory, but such allegations are too broad and conclusory to survive a 12(b)(6) motion.
ZALMA OPINION
In the United States reporting a person to prosecutors for a crime is privileged unless made with malice. In this case the charges went to a grand jury that issued an indictment that established probable cause for arrest. That she was acquitted established only that the state failed to prove her claims of malicious prosecution and other torts beyond a reasonable doubt. She may attempt to prove that Texas Mutual defamed her. Note, truth is a perfect defense to a defamation action and the fact that a grand jury issued an indictment indicates that the reports Texas Mutual were truthful.
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Post 5489
Posted on September 14, 2026 by Barry Zalma
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See the full video at https://lnkd.in/gvicAMDr and at https://lnkd.in/gvicAMDr
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Policy Limits Demand Accepted Settles Claim
Post 5434
Posted on August 26, 2026 by Barry Zalma
See the full video at https://lnkd.in/g-ZtsSgK and at https://lnkd.in/ghMBdYWR
A Contingent Offer Accepted Ends the Dispute
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Archer rear-ended Kathleen Ann Wood at a red light, causing Wood to assert a bodily injury claim against him. Wood’s counsel sent Farmers a pre-litigation settlement demand offering to resolve Wood’s claim for the available policy limits, stating that if the $100,000 demand exceeded the policy, the offer was for the policy limits.
Farmers timely responded in writing, agreed to pay Wood the $15,000 per-person policy limit, and provided the requested ...
Policy Limits Demand Accepted Settles Claim
Post 5434
Posted on August 26, 2026 by Barry Zalma
See the full video at https://lnkd.in/g-ZtsSgK and at https://lnkd.in/ghMBdYWR
A Contingent Offer Accepted Ends the Dispute
In Farmers Insurance Exchange, a California Reciprocal Insurance Exchange, The Superior Court For The County Of San Bernardino, Kathleen Ann Wood, E087128, California Court of Appeals, (July 9, 2026) Farmers Insurance Exchange insured Doyle Archer under an automobile policy with bodily injury limits of $15,000 per person and $30,000 per accident.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Archer rear-ended Kathleen Ann Wood at a red light, causing Wood to assert a bodily injury claim against him. Wood’s counsel sent Farmers a pre-litigation settlement demand offering to resolve Wood’s claim for the available policy limits, stating that if the $100,000 demand exceeded the policy, the offer was for the policy limits.
Farmers timely responded in writing, agreed to pay Wood the $15,000 per-person policy limit, and provided the requested ...
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Post 5488
Posted on September 11, 2026 by Barry Zalma
ACE Was Not Required To Produce Any Disputed Document Because Each Was Protected By The Attorney-Client Privilege, or The Work-Product Doctrine.
See the full video at and at https://rumble.com/v7fbzvo-arson-for-profit-is-ground-to-deny-claim.html
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South Metro Fire Rescue classified the ignition as intentional, and ACE’s retained expert concluded that gasoline had been poured in multiple areas and ignited. ACE retained coverage and subrogation counsel, National Subrogation Services, and a cause-and-origin expert ...
Arson for Profit is Ground to Deny Claim
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Communications with Arson Investigation is Privileged
Post 5488
ACE Was Not Required To Produce Any Disputed Document Because Each Was Protected By The Attorney-Client Privilege, or The Work-Product Doctrine.
See the full video at and at https://rumble.com/v7fbzvo-arson-for-profit-is-ground-to-deny-claim.html
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South Metro Fire Rescue classified the ignition as intentional.
After reviewing the disputed documents in camera, the court found that each was protected.
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Post 5487
Posted on September 10, 2026 by Barry Zalma
In WIZ Collision, LLC, on behalf of itself and as assignee of Jawara Small, Chester Street LLC, and Aziz Brooks v. GEICO Corporation, No. 25-cv-4201 (KAM)(JAM), United States District Court, E.D. New York (August 28, 2026) Wiz Collision, a New York City auto-body shop, regularly repaired vehicles and submitted insurance claims for customers. It alleged that GEICO repeatedly approved claims and repairs, then referred certain claims to its Special Investigations Unit, stopped issuing payments, and delayed resolution despite ultimately finding no fraud.
Wiz Collision sued on its own behalf and as purported assignee of three customers, asserting contract, good-faith, consumer-protection, and injunctive claims. GEICO removed the case and moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
LAW
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead facts supporting a facially plausible claim. Article III standing requires a concrete injury, ...
