Courts Must Never Speculate About Facts Not in Evidence
Post 5192
See the full video at https://rumble.com/v6z2r2s-duty-to-defend-is-not-without-limit.html and at https://youtu.be/3hhYFmKmGmA, and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 5,150 posts.
Injuries to Others at McDonald’s Do Not Provide Duty to Defend Suit by Employee Who Did Not Incur Bodily Injury
in McdDonald’s Corporation, et al v. Homeland Insurance Company Of New York, No. 23 C 16297, United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division (September 10, 2025) McDonald’s Corporation and McDonald’s USA LLC (collectively, “McDonald’s”) sued Defendant Homeland Insurance Company of New York (“Homeland”) challenging Homeland’s denial of coverage under a commercial general liability insurance policy.
BACKGROUND
A McDonald’s franchisee operated the McDonald’s restaurant (“Restaurant”) located in Chicago, Illinois. (hereinafter, “PRSOF”). From March 1, 2015 through March 1, 2018, the franchisee maintained a commercial general liability policy (“Policy”) issued by Homeland.
Section I of the Policy provides: “We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ to which this insurance applies.” Importantly, the Policy dictates that a bodily injury is covered only if takes place during the policy period, i.e., March 1, 2015, through March 1, 2018.
McDonald’s attempted to utilize the Policy after being sued by a Restaurant employee in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Sonia Acuna, et al. v. McDonalds, et al., No. 2019 CH 13477 (“Underlying Action”). Ultimately, Acuna was a party to four different complaints in the Underlying Action; her participation culminated with the filing of the third amended complaint on July 19, 2021. Since Acuna was the sole plaintiff in the Underlying Action who worked at the Restaurant, only her specific claims are relevant to this dispute.
After evaluating the lawsuit and the Policy, Homeland denied coverage because Acuna did not allege any “bodily injury” during the policy period.
DISCUSSION
The factual allegations in the amended complaint state a vicarious liability claim that falls within the coverage of the insurance policy, and therefore, plaintiff’s amended complaint was not an improper or unsupported attempt to plead into coverage.
The Operative Complaint includes allegations of specific incidents involving Acuna, which McDonald’s concedes cannot trigger Homeland’s duty to defend because they occurred outside the policy period, and more generalized allegations of harm.
An insurer has a duty to defend when the complaint’s allegations fall within or potentially fall within the coverage provisions of the policy. Because a complaint need not allege or use language affirmatively bringing the claims within the scope of the policy, the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify.
The duty to defend depends on the facts underlying a complaint, not the specific legal theory on which the plaintiffs base their claims. Illinois courts follow the so-called “eight-corners rule” where courts determine the duty to defend by looking only within the four corners of the insurance policy and the four corners of the complaint for which defense is sought.
The insurer’s duty to defend, while broad, is not without limits. Notwithstanding the breadth of the duty, the claim against the insured must still contain explicit factual allegations that potentially fall within policy coverage. While the Court must examine the underlying claims with care, it cannot read into the complaint facts that are not there.
Generalized allegations are not enough
The gist of Acuna’s claims is that witnessing bodily injury inflicted on others resulted in psychological harm to her. The Operative Complaint, and all preceding complaints for that matter, were devoid of facts establishing that Acuna sought damages for a covered bodily injury that occurred during the policy period.
A Court may not find a duty to defend based on conjecture. The duty to defend may be broad, but Illinois law does not permit the court to speculate about possible factual scenarios that are absent from the claim itself. Even if it could, second-hand injuries such as fear and emotional distress caused by viewing other persons’ bodily injuries are simply not covered by the Policy.
Therefore the Court found no duty to defend and granted summary judgment in favor of Homeland.
ZALMA OPINION
The Illinois 8 corners rule made the decision of the Court obvious because the allegations of the complaint by Ms. Acuna did not fit the definitions of injury within the policy’s effective dates. Since there must be a bodily injury within the policy’s effective dates and no evidence existed the court properly refused to speculate and granted Homeland’s summary judgment.
(c) 2025 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc.
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Arsonist Tried To Represent Himself, Failed, and Sought Habeas Relief
Post number 5357
Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/he-who-acts-his-own-lawyer-has-idiot-client-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-d4bwc, See the full video at and at and at https://zalma.com/blog.
Karacson’s Arson for Profit Attempt Required Skill & Experience to Succeed
In Steve Ellis Karacson v. David Shaver, Warden, No. 25-1089, United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit (May 20, 2026) Steve Karacson was convicted in Michigan state court of arson and insurance fraud after evidence showed he burned his own insured home. Investigators found multiple points of origin, gasoline odor, and evidence tying him to the scene, including cell-phone location data and a receipt showing he had purchased a gas can and gloves shortly before the fire.
FACTS
Karacson initially had appointed counsel, but his relationships with both appointed attorneys ...
Foolish to Repeatedly Disobey Court Orders
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Post number 5348
See the full video at and at and at https://zalma.com/blog plus 5300 posts.
In Linh Wang v. Esurance Insurance Company, No. C24-0447-JCC, United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle (May 1, 2026) John C. Coughenour, United States District Judge, found that throughout this case, culminating with its briefing on Plaintiff’s renewed motion and that Defendant has subjected Plaintiff to unnecessary motion practice for clearly discoverable information and made dubious representations (including to the Court).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case involves an underinsured/uninsured motorist insurance bad faith claim arising from a 2017 motor vehicle collision. The plaintiff, Linh Wang, alleges that Esurance Insurance ...
The Right to Negotiate with Insurer is Not an Assignment of Claims
Post number 5347
Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/ambiguous-contract-repair-assignment-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-2xppc, see the full video at https://rumble.com/v79is1s-ambiguous-contract-to-repair-not-an-assignment.html and at and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 5300 posts.
Nebraska Requires an Actual Assignment to Allow Contractor to Sue Insurer
In Millard Gutter Company, a corporation doing business as Millard Roofing and Gutter v. Farmers Mutual Insurance Company of Nebraska, also known as Farmers Mutual Insurance, also known as Farmers Mutual, No. A-24-818, Court of Appeals of Nebraska (May 5, 2026) Millard sued Farmers as an assignee of Jane Anzalone who had hired Millard Gutter to repair the roof of her home and agreed to allow Millard Gutter to coordinate with her insurer, Farmers Mutual, concerning reimbursement for repairs authorized under her insurance policy.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In ...
Qui Tam Case Without Evidence to Prove Fraud Fails
Post number 5369
Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/qui-tam-insurer-contended-defrauded-barry-zalma-esq-cfe-pgfgc and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 5550 posts.
In People Of The State Of California Ex Rel. Heath & Yuen, APC v. Silver Bird Auto Leasing, LLC et al., B342847, California Court of Appeals, Second District, Eighth Division (June 5, 2026) Heath & Yuen, APC defended parties in an automobile collision case involving a McLaren and a tour van. After that case settled for $25,000, the firm filed a qui tam action under California’s Insurance Frauds Prevention Act (IFPA) against Silver Bird Auto Leasing, LLC, X-Law Group, PC, and Filippo Marchino. The firm alleged three fraudulent acts in the underlying litigation:
1. the complaint falsely stated the McLaren was making a “legal turn,”
2. respondents produced a fraudulent repair bill/estimate, and
3. respondents failed to disclose Marchino’s GEICO insurance and its payment for repairs....
Full Faith and Credit Act Controlled
Read the full article at https://lnkd.in/evHXiiFE and at https://zalma.com/blog.
Posted on June 9, 2026 by Barry Zalma
Post number 5368
Posted on June 9, 2026 by Barry Zalma
In Prime Insurance Company, Inc. v. Medicab Transportation, LLC, Jason Rhodes, and Dale Johnson v. Prime Insurance Company, Inc and Prime Property & Casualty Insurance, Inc. No. 2:24-cv-421-SPC-KRH, United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division (June 3, 2026) Medicab, a paratransit company, bought two policies in 2021: a Business Auto Policy from PPCI and a Commercial Liability Policy from Prime. Both policies, as originally written, appeared to cover injuries arising from loading and unloading patients from Medicab vans.
After a patient, Margaret St. Aubin, fell while being unloaded from a van and suffered injuries, her Estate made a $1 million demand. Prime and its claims administrator concluded that the Commercial Policy’s loading/unloading language had been included by mutual mistake, because...
Full Faith and Credit Act Controlled
Read the full article at https://lnkd.in/evHXiiFE and at https://zalma.com/blog.
Posted on June 9, 2026 by Barry Zalma
Post number 5368
Posted on June 9, 2026 by Barry Zalma
In Prime Insurance Company, Inc. v. Medicab Transportation, LLC, Jason Rhodes, and Dale Johnson v. Prime Insurance Company, Inc and Prime Property & Casualty Insurance, Inc. No. 2:24-cv-421-SPC-KRH, United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division (June 3, 2026) Medicab, a paratransit company, bought two policies in 2021: a Business Auto Policy from PPCI and a Commercial Liability Policy from Prime. Both policies, as originally written, appeared to cover injuries arising from loading and unloading patients from Medicab vans.
After a patient, Margaret St. Aubin, fell while being unloaded from a van and suffered injuries, her Estate made a $1 million demand. Prime and its claims administrator concluded that the Commercial Policy’s loading/unloading language had been included by mutual mistake, because...
