Oregon Allows Emotional Distress Damages for Poor Claims Handling
Barry Zalma
Jan 9, 2024
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Post 4706
Christine Moody, individually, and in her capacity as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Steven “Troy” Moody, Deceased v. Oregon Community Credit Union, aka OCCU, an Oregon entity, association, union, or corporation et al., Defendants, and Federal Insurance Company, an Indiana corporation, 371 Or. 772, SC S069409, Supreme Court of Oregon (December 29, 2023)
Plaintiff, whose husband was accidentally shot and killed during a camping trip, brought this action against defendant, a first-party life insurer, claiming, among other things, that defendant had negligently failed to investigate and pay her claim for policy benefits, causing her to have fewer financial resources to navigate the loss of a bread-winning spouse and, consequently, to suffer economic harm and emotional distress.
FACTS
Plaintiffs husband, decedent, was accidentally shot and killed by a friend during a camping trip. Plaintiff filed a claim for life insurance policy benefits, and defendant initially denied plaintiffs claim on the ground that decedent’s death fell within a policy exclusion for deaths “caused by or resulting from [decedent] being under the influence of any narcotic or other controlled substance”-apparently based on the fact that decedent had had marijuana in his system at the time of his death.
Plaintiff sued alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of an implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and negligence. Plaintiff sought both economic damages-the benefits payable under the policy-and emotional distress damages.
Defendant filed motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims for negligence and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and to strike the allegations seeking damages for emotional distress, arguing that plaintiffs only remedy under Oregon law was contractual. Plaintiff appealed the limited judgment but, while the appeal was pending, she filed an amended complaint that alleged only breach of contract and sought only the amount of benefits payable under the insurance policy-$3,000. Thereafter, defendant paid the $3,000 to plaintiff, the parties stipulated to the entry of a judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant, and the trial court entered a conforming general judgment.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff takes the position that her claim for common-law negligence against defendant for its failure to act reasonably in performing the obligations of a life insurer and that she is entitled to recover the emotional distress damages that she alleges.
Plaintiffs’ Negligence per se claim is a shorthand for a negligence claim in which the standard of care is expressed by a statute or rule. When a negligence claim exists, and a statute or rule defines the standard of care expected of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances, a violation of that statute or rule establishes a presumption of negligence.
The Supreme Court Concluded that it is settled that a negligence complaint, to survive a motion to dismiss, must allege facts from which a factfinder could determine (1) that defendant’s conduct caused a foreseeable risk of harm, (2) that the risk is to an interest of a kind that the law protects against negligent invasion, (3) that defendant’s conduct was unreasonable in light of the risk, (4) that the conduct was a cause of plaintiffs harm, and (5) that plaintiff was within the class of persons and plaintiffs injury was within the general type of potential incidents and injuries that made defendant’s conduct negligent.
Perhaps the simplest legally protected interest is in being free from physical harm at the hands of another. Physical harm includes both bodily injury and property damage. Generally, however, people do not have a legally protected interest in being free from emotional distress, and, to date, the Supreme Court has permitted common-law tort claims for emotional distress damages only in the following three circumstances: (1) when the defendant also physically injures the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant intentionally causes the emotional distress; or (3) when the defendant negligently causes foreseeable, serious emotional distress and also infringes some other legally protected interest.
In contrast to physical harm, emotional harm occurs frequently. Any number of people may suffer emotional distress as the foreseeable result of a single negligent act.
Whether Plaintiff Here Has Alleged A Legally Protected Interest Sufficient To Subject Defendant To Liability For Purely Emotional Damages
In the case now before us, we must consider whether plaintiff has alleged a legally protected interest sufficient to subject defendant to liability for emotional distress damages. To decide whether that alleged interest is a legally protected interest sufficient to subject defendant to liability for emotional distress damages.
The statute, ORS 746.230, prohibits (1) “[refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based on all available information,” ORS 746.230(1) (d); and (2) “[n]ot attempting, in good faith, to promptly and equitably settle claims in which liability has become reasonably clear,” ORS 746.230(1)(f).
ORS 746.230 includes conduct that is independent of the obligation to pay benefits due under the insurance policy. For example, ORS 746.230 prohibits insurers from, “[flailing to acknowledge and act promptly upon communications relating to claims,” ORS 746.230.230(1)(b); “[f]ailing to affirm *** coverage of claims within a reasonable time,” ORS 746.230.230(1)(e); and “Compelling claimants to initiate litigation to recover amounts due,” ORS 746.230(1)(g). Those prohibitions suggest that the harm that the legislature sought to prevent was not limited to the financial harm that occurs when insurance benefits are not paid.
The Supreme Court will not permit recovery of purely emotional injury unless it determines that the claimed harm is “of sufficient importance as a matter of public policy.” The Supreme Court concluded that the question whether plaintiff has alleged a viable common-law negligence claim against defendant for emotional distress damages in the affirmative. It then cautioned that the conclusion does not make every contracting party liable for negligent conduct that causes purely psychological damage, nor does it make every statutory violation the basis for a common-law negligence claim for emotional distress damages. Far from it. Few contracting parties promise to provide necessary financial resources on the death of a spouse knowing that their obligation to act reasonably in doing so is required by statute. And few statutes impose obligations on contracting parties designed to protect the parties from the type of emotional harm that plaintiff in this case allegedly suffered. The decision in this case is a narrow one that applies and accords with the limiting principles that have been guided by past decisions and does not unfairly expose defendant to liabilities that it could not have expected and guarded against.
Plaintiff has alleged a viable common-law negligence claim against defendant for emotional distress damages. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motions to dismiss plaintiffs negligence claim and in striking her claim for emotional distress damages.
ZALMA OPINION
The state of Oregon, like many states, has enacted statutes punishing insurers for bad faith claims handling. The insurer, after a change in allegations, paid the plaintiff the $3,000 life insurance limit, only to find itself sued for negligent claims handling. The suit was dismissed by the trial court and reversed by the Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court. Since the statute requires fair claims handling the plaintiffs allegations allowed it to sue the insurer for emotional distress damages when it initially refused to pay because of an exclusion. This is a limited decision and stretches the obligations of an insurer beyond fairness and even with a clear and unambiguous exclusion it can be sued for emotional distress.
(c) 2024 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc.
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Jury’s Findings Interpreting Insurance Contract Affirmed
Post 5105
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Madelaine Chocolate Novelties, Inc. (“Madelaine Chocolate”) appealed the district court’s judgment following a jury verdict in favor of Great Northern Insurance Company (“Great Northern”) concerning storm-surge damage caused by “Superstorm Sandy” to Madelaine Chocolate’s production facilities.
In Madelaine Chocolate Novelties, Inc., d.b.a. The Madelaine Chocolate Company v. Great Northern Insurance Company, No. 23-212, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit (June 20, 2025) affirmed the trial court ruling in favor of the insurer.
BACKGROUND
Great Northern refused to pay the full claim amount and paid Madelaine Chocolate only about $4 million. In disclaiming coverage, Great Northern invoked the Policy’s flood-exclusion provision, which excludes, in relevant part, “loss or damage caused by ....
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In Associated Industries Insurance Company, Inc. v. Sentinel Insurance Company, Ltd., No. 23-CV-10400 (MMG), United States District Court, S.D. New York (June 16, 2025) an insurance coverage dispute arising from a personal injury action in New York State Supreme Court.
The underlying action, Eduardo Molina v. Venchi 2, LLC, et al., concerned injuries allegedly resulting from a construction accident at premises owned by Central Area Equities Associates LLC (CAEA) and leased by Venchi 2 LLC with the USDC required to determine who was entitled to a defense from which insurer.
KEY POINTS
Parties Involved:
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Post 5103
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Attack by Vicious Dog Excluded
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Foremost Insurance Company (“Foremost”) sued Michael B. Steele (“Steele”), Sarah Brown (“Brown”), and Kevin Lee Price (“Price”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Foremost sought declaratory relief in the form of a declaration that
1. it owes no insurance coverage to Steele and has no duty to defend or indemnify Steele in an underlying tort action and
2. defense counsel that Foremost has assigned to Steele in the underlying action may withdraw his appearance.
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ZIFL Volume 29, Issue 10
The Source for the Insurance Fraud Professional
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Zalma’s Insurance Fraud Letter (ZIFL) continues its 29th year of publication dedicated to those involved in reducing the effect of insurance fraud. ZIFL is published 24 times a year by ClaimSchool and is written by Barry Zalma. It is provided FREE to anyone who visits the site at http://zalma.com/zalmas-insurance-fraud-letter-2/ You can read the full issue of the May 15, 2025 issue at http://zalma.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/ZIFL-05-15-2025.pdf
This issue contains the following articles about insurance fraud:
Health Care Fraud Trial Results in Murder for Hire of Witness
To Avoid Conviction for Insurance Fraud Defendants Murder Witness
In United States of America v. Louis Age, Jr.; Stanton Guillory; Louis Age, III; Ronald Wilson, Jr., No. 22-30656, United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit (April 25, 2025) the Fifth Circuit dealt with the ...
Professional Health Care Services Exclusion Effective
Post 5073
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This opinion is the recommendation of a Magistrate Judge to the District Court Judge and involves Travelers Casualty Insurance Company and its duty to defend the New Mexico Bone and Joint Institute (NMBJI) and its physicians in a medical negligence lawsuit brought by Tervon Dorsey.
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Insurance Coverage Dispute:
Travelers issued a Commercial General Liability ...
A Heads I Win, Tails You Lose Story
Post 5062
Posted on April 30, 2025 by Barry Zalma
"This is a Fictionalized True Crime Story of Insurance Fraud that explains why Insurance Fraud is a “Heads I Win, Tails You Lose” situation for Insurers. The story is designed to help everyone to Understand How Insurance Fraud in America is Costing Everyone who Buys Insurance Thousands of Dollars Every year and Why Insurance Fraud is Safer and More Profitable for the Perpetrators than any Other Crime."
Immigrant Criminals Attempt to Profit From Insurance Fraud
People who commit insurance fraud as a profession do so because it is easy. It requires no capital investment. The risk is low and the profits are high. The ease with which large amounts of money can be made from insurance fraud removes whatever moral hesitation might stop the perpetrator from committing the crime.
The temptation to do everything outside the law was the downfall of the brothers Karamazov. The brothers had escaped prison in the old Soviet Union by immigrating to the United...