Those who Commit Insurance Fraud Have Funds to Issue Interminable Motions & Appeals
Read the full article at https://lnkd.in/gZYTuYi2 and at https://zalma.com/blog.
Insurance fraud convictions are unreasonably rare and when the perpetrator is convicted the convicted defendant seems to have unlimited funds to appeal the convictions. Imtiaz Shareef, after his conviction, unsuccessful in his first appeal filed a new appeal claiming his lawyers failed him.
In Imtiaz Shareef v. United States Of America, Nos. 3:22-cv-001144-RJC, 3:18-cr-00157-RJC-DCK-3, United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Charlotte Division (May 4, 2022) the USDC put a stop to Shareef's appeals.
BACKGROUND
On April 19, 2018, a federal grand jury indicted Petitioner Imtiaz Shareef, along with three coconspirators, on one count of wire fraud and bank fraud conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (Count One) and one count of money laundering conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count Two). As to Count One, the Indictment charged that, “[f]rom in or about April 2009 through in or about April 2018, ... [Petitioner and the coconspirators] did knowingly ... conspire ... to commit offenses against the United States, including violations of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1343 (wire fraud) and 1344 (bank fraud).”
Title 18, Section 1349 provides:
Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this chapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy. [18 U.S.C. § 1349].
Petitioner proceeded to trial and the jury convicted him on both counts. On Count One, the jury specifically found that “wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343” and “bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344” were objects of the conspiracy. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 57 months on each count to be served concurrently.
On appeal, Petitioner argued that “the insurance fraud scheme supporting the wire fraud object of the conspiracy concluded prior to the running of the statute of limitations and, even if the charge was timely, insufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict.” United States v. Shareef, 852 Fed. App'x 92, 93 (4th Cir. 2021). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the USDC's judgment. He also unsuccessfully argued that prior acts evidence was inappropriately admitted against him and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a “reliance-on-expert” jury instruction.
Not deterred by his failure at the Fourth Circuit, on March 30, 2022, Petitioner filed a new motion in the USDC and made two claims:
prosecutorial misconduct for the Government submitting 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1344 to support Petitioner's conviction without submitting such statutes to the grand jury; and
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel for failing to adequately introduce into the record evidence showing that Petitioner was indicted only for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 and 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (h), and allowing the Government to convict or maintain a conviction for Title 18 U.S.C. 1343 and 18 U.S.C. 1344 unconstitutionally.
Shareef asked that his conviction be vacated for what he alleged were many due -process violations.
DISCUSSION
Prosecutorial Misconduct
The Verdict Form submitted to the jury mirrored the charges set forth in the Indictment. And, consistent with the Indictment, the jury found that “wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343” and “bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344” were objects of the conspiracy. There was, therefore, no prosecutorial misconduct relative to the sufficiency of the Indictment or the way the charges were presented to the jury.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused has the right to the assistance of counsel for his defense. To show ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must first establish a deficient performance by counsel and, second, that the deficient performance prejudiced him. In making this determination, there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Furthermore, in considering the prejudice prong of the analysis, the Court can only grant relief if the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable. Under these circumstances, the petitioner bears the burden of affirmatively proving prejudice. [Bowie v. Branker, 512 F.3d 112, 120 (4th Cir. 2008)].
If the petitioner fails, as did Shareef, to meet this burden, a reviewing court need not even consider the performance prong.
Appellate counsel is not required to assert all non-frivolous issues on appeal. Rather, it is the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy to winnow out weaker arguments and to focus on more promising issues.
A decision with respect to an appeal is entitled to the same presumption that protects sound trial strategy. Additionally, the petitioner still bears the burden of showing that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's failure to raise an issue on appeal, the result of the proceeding would have been different; i.e., that he would have prevailed on appeal.
The Indictment plainly set forth that the objects of the conspiracy were the violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1344 and Petitioner was convicted accordingly. There was no deficient performance by Petitioner's trial or appellate counsel for their failure to raise or attempt to support a frivolous argument.
Petitioner's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [Doc. 1] was denied and the USDC refused to allow further appeal.
ZALMA OPINION
The USDC refused to properly allow Shareef to abuse the judicial process a second time and kept him jailed in accordance with his conviction. The court, in addition, to ruling on this frivolous motion should have sanctioned Shareef and his lawyers for wasting the time of the court with a frivolous appeal.
(c) 2022 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc.
Barry Zalma, Esq., CFE, now limits his practice to service as an insurance consultant specializing in insurance coverage, insurance claims handling, insurance bad faith and insurance fraud almost equally for insurers and policyholders. He practiced law in California for more than 44 years as an insurance coverage and claims handling lawyer and more than 54 years in the insurance business. He is available at http://www.zalma.com and [email protected].
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Insurance Expert May Not Testify to Speculative and Contains Unsupported Conclusions.
Posted on September 18, 2026 by Barry Zalma
See the full video at and at https://rumble.com/v7fmifw-expert-may-only-testify-to-what-experience-supports.html
In Michele A. Over, and The Estate Of Paul R. Over v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, and State Farm Fire And Casualty Company, Civil Action No. 23-cv-02243-PAB-STV, United States District Court, D. Colorado (September 14, 2026) Michele and Paul Over sued State Farm Fire and State Farm Auto over hail-damage and stolen-vehicle claims.
The operative dispute concerned State Farm Auto’s motion to exclude or limit opinions from plaintiffs’ insurance-industry expert, Aaron Castillo. Castillo.
Law
The proponent of expert testimony must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that an expert is qualified and that the opinions are helpful, sufficiently grounded, and reliably derived and applied. Experience-based opinions must explain how the...
150 Months in Prison for Tax Fraud
Post 4846
Posted on September 17, 2026 by Barry Zalma
See the full video at https://lnkd.in/g8rh3JBX and https://lnkd.in/gmkdy-9C, In United States Of America v. Thomas Addaquay, Nos. 25-10609, 25-10611, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit (September 9, 2026) the Eleventh Circuit affirmed all challenged convictions, the 150-month aggregate sentence, and the challenged $4,123,474.55 restitution award.
FACTS
In United States Of America v. Thomas Addaquay, United States Of America v. Thomas Addaquay, Nos. 25-10609, 25-10611, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit (September 9, 2026) the Eleventh Circuit affirmed all challenged convictions, the 150-month aggregate sentence, and the challenged $4,123,474.55 restitution award.
FACTS
Thomas Addaquay controlled United Consolidated Accounting and Business Services (UC), nominally a check-cashing business.
The government proved a three-stage tax-refund scheme that converted the resulting refund checks into usable funds through ...
Major Fraud Perpetrator Asserts Fifth Amendment Privilege to Avoid Prosecution
Post 5489
Posted on September 14, 2026 by Barry Zalma
Fraudster Refuses to Answer Questions About His Alleged Fraud
See the full video at https://lnkd.in/gvicAMDr and at https://lnkd.in/gvicAMDr
In Great American Insurance Co. v. Gemstone Property Management, LLC, et al., No. 23-cv-9100 (LJL), United States District Court, S.D. New York (September 8, 2026) Great American Insurance Company alleged that it was defrauded through a scheme in which Subin Associates, LLP recruited individuals to stage construction-site injuries, arranged unnecessary medical treatment and litigation funding, and pursued fraudulent personal-injury claims.
Luis Manuel Garcia Salcedo, resulted in a $6 million settlement. Non-party Jose Hernandez allegedly worked as an assistant manager at Subin, operated Hernandez Associates, and owned litigation-funding companies that shared office space with Subin and provided services to its clients.
After Great American ...
Theft of Confidential Information
Post 4581
Posted on November 12, 2026 by Barry Zalma
In People Center, Inc. v. Deel, Inc., et al., No. 25-cv-02576-CRB (LJC), United States District Court, N.D. California (November 7, 2026) People Center, doing business as Rippling, and Deel compete in payroll and human-resource management software. Rippling alleges that Deel and its executives recruited Rippling employee Keith O’Brien, based in Ireland, to disclose confidential information and trade secrets.
THE IRISH SUIT
Rippling sued O’Brien in Ireland and Deel in the United States. O’Brien subsequently retained separate counsel, supplied an affidavit describing the alleged espionage, and entered into a Cooperation Agreement with Rippling. In exchange for his cooperation, Rippling agreed to provide financial assistance, indemnification, and conditional dismissal of the Irish proceedings. The agreement also permitted renewed proceedings or a monetary judgment upon a material breach.
The Irish proceedings against O’Brien were dismissed...
A Proposed Amended Complaint That Includes New Factual Allegations to Remedy Pleading Deficiencies
Posted on November 11, 2026 by Barry Zalma
After Dismissal Fraud Victim May Amend Complaint After Dismissal
Post 4580
If A Proposed Amendment Is Not Clearly Futile, Then Denial Of Leave To Amend Is Improper
In John Hancock Life & Health Insurance Company v. Caring Connections LLC, Arthur Feldheim, and Blime a/k/a Vera Feldheim, Civ. No. 25-7574 (MAS)(JBD), United States District Court, D. New Jersey (November 6, 2026) John Hancock sued Caring Connections LLC, Arthur Feldheim, and Blime a/k/a Vera Feldheim on June 5, 2025, asserting thirteen claims, including fraud, breach of contract, and aiding and abetting fraud.
On March 26, 2026, this Court entered an order granting Caring Connections’ motion to dismiss and granting in part and denying in part the Feldheims’ motion to dismiss. The dismissed claims were dismissed without prejudice, and John Hancock timely sought leave to amend.
They also argued that the New ...
Is Exhaustion Required to Seek Declaratory Relief From an Excess Insurer?
Post 4578
Posted on November 9, 2026 by Barry Zalma
In Fox Paine & Company, LLC, et al. v. Twin City Fire Insurance Company et al., S287404, 593 P.3d 832, 593 P.3d 838, 346 Cal.Rptr.3d 541, Supreme Court of California, (July 27, 2026) the Supreme Court noted that Insurance is sometimes procured in a series of layers, with an insured acquiring a primary insurance policy that provides an initial layer of coverage for loss or liability and an excess insurance policy or policies that provide additional coverage in the event the underlying coverage is exhausted. Usually, the first layer of coverage must be exhausted before the excess layers are available to the insured.
Exhaustion
Fox and Paine’s investment-firm dispute generated extensive litigation and competing insurance claims. Their insurance tower consisted of a $10 million primary policy and four $10 million excess layers.
The Fox Parties alleged that insurers paid their rivals, withheld information,...