Zalma on Insurance
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March 09, 2022
Tort Victim Not a Beneficiary of a Mortgage Requiring Borrower to Buy Insurance

Mortgage Insurance Requirements Are Solely for the Benefit of the Lender

Read the full article at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/tort-victim-beneficiary-mortgage-requiring-borrower-zalma-esq-cfe and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 4100 posts.

Posted on March 9, 2022 by Barry Zalma

The district court awarded Christopher Bookter damages in a civil action against Jeromy Brooks, the owner of Chicks Pool Hall (Chicks), and a bartender, Wyatt A. Knisley after being injured in a fight at the Pool Hall. To satisfy the judgment, the district court ordered the pool hall seized and sold. Community State Bank (CSB) held a first mortgage on the pool hall and intervened as priority lienholder.

Bookter filed a cross-claim against CSB alleging negligence because it did not enforce the insurance provision in the mortgage contract. The district court granted summary judgment to CSB on the cross-claim, finding that Bookter was not an intended third-party beneficiary of the mortgage contract between CSB and Brooks. In Christopher Bookter v. Wyatt A. Knisley, et al., and Community State Bank, No. 123, 972, Court of Appeals of Kansas (March 4, 2022) the Court of Appeals resolved the issue of standing.
FACTS

Brooks owned and operated Chicks in Coffeyville, Kansas. CSB loaned Brooks $45,000 which he secured with a mortgage on Chicks filed on August 29, 2017. On January 16, 2019, Bookter patronized Chicks and got into a fight with Knisley, the bartender. Bookter suffered a concussion, multiple contusions and lacerations, a closed fracture of the maxillary sinus, and a fractured orbital floor of the left eye. Bookter’s injuries required hospitalization and reconstructive surgery.

Bookter sued Knisley for assault and battery and the bar owner, Brooks, under the theory of respondeat superior. Bookter filed a motion for summary judgment and the district court granted summary judgment to Bookter and awarded him more than $380,000 in economic and noneconomic damages.

After the judgment the district court ordered the Sheriff to seize and sell the pool hall to satisfy the judgment. CSB, as priority lienholder, moved to intervene. Bookter filed a cross-claim against CSB alleging negligence for not mandating that Brooks renew or secure liability insurance as required by the mortgage. Bookter asserted that he was entitled to recovery as a “third party creditor beneficiary” of the mortgage contract.

The district court granted CSB’s motion for summary judgment.
THE MORTGAGE

The mortgage contains the following language: ‘PROPERTY DAMAGE INSURANCE. … [Brooks] shall also procure and maintain comprehensive general liability insurance in such coverage amounts as [CSB] may request with [CSB] being named as additional insureds in such liability insurance policies…. Each insurance policy also shall include an endorsement providing that coverage in favor of [CSB] will not be impaired in any way by any act, omission or default of [Brooks] or any other person. . . .

In granting summary judgment for CSB, the district court found that Bookter was not an expressly intended third-party beneficiary to the mortgage agreement. The district court found that Bookter may have been an incidental beneficiary of any agreement to maintain insurance, but as an incidental beneficiary Bookter had no right to recovery under Kansas law.

The mortgage required the borrower to procure and maintain comprehensive general liability insurance in such coverage amounts as the lender “may request.” In another agreement signed by Brooks, the “Agreement to Provide Insurance,” it stated that Brooks would acquire minimum insurance coverage for the loan collateral including all inventory, equipment, and fixtures. The agreement provided that if Brooks failed to maintain adequate insurance coverage, then CSB could purchase coverage up to the balance of the loan.

Brooks, complying with the contracts, secured insurance coverage with United Specialty Insurance Company and provided CSB with a copy of the policy. The policy contained an exclusion for assault and battery and lapsed after a year.

While it is standard practice for lenders to require borrowers to maintain insurance, there is no law requiring it. The requirement is solely contractual and up to CSB to enforce.

CSB did not exercise its right under the agreement to purchase insurance on Brooks’ behalf when the policy lapsed. As a result, there was no liability policy in effect when Bookter sustained his injuries at Chicks. Even if a policy had been in effect, the coverage limit would have been $45,000, and it is questionable whether the policy would have provided coverage for the assault and battery Bookter alleged Knisley committed.
ANALYSIS

The district court granted summary judgment to CSB, finding Bookter was not a third-party beneficiary to the contract and thus lacked standing. Standing is a jurisdictional question which determines whether a litigant has a right to have a court determine the merits of the issues presented.

A party not privy to a contract has standing to sue as a third-party beneficiary if he or she establishes that the contract was made for his or her benefit, though not necessarily exclusively, and the parties intended that he or she benefit as a third-party beneficiary. Only an intended beneficiary has standing to sue for damages resulting from a breach of the contract. An intended beneficiary is one that the contracting parties intended the contract to benefit.

Mere knowledge by the contracting parties that a third party could benefit from the contract does not imply the contracting parties’ intent to benefit the third party.

Bookter tries to argue that the general liability insurance was meant to cover assault and battery, which he claims is the “primary liability risk associated with the business activity of the pool hall.” Bookter says that the risk of personal injury by assault and battery was known or should have been known by the loan officers and that is why the bank required the liability coverage. Although the pool hall had a CGL policy, that expired before the incident, it excluded assault and battery.
Standing

To have standing as a third-party beneficiary, Bookter must show that the mortgage contract was expressly intended to benefit him, or others in the same class as him.

The undisputed evidence before the district court showed that the intent of the insurance provision in the mortgage contract was solely for the benefit of CSB. Thus, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to CSB.
ZALMA OPINION

Bookter, injured and with a $380,000 judgment that he could not collect – even if the property of the pool hall was sold – without first paying the judgment tried to create a right against the bank that held the mortgage on the property of the pool hall did not compel the pool hall to buy CGL insurance that covered assault and battery. Unfortunately for Bookter he had no standing and his creative efforts to find a way to collect his judgment failed.

© 2022 – Barry Zalma

Barry Zalma, Esq., CFE, now limits his practice to service as an insurance consultant specializing in insurance coverage, insurance claims handling, insurance bad faith and insurance fraud almost equally for insurers and policyholders.

He practiced law in California for more than 44 years as an insurance coverage and claims handling lawyer and more than 54 years in the insurance business.

Subscribe to “Zalma on Insurance” at https://zalmaoninsurance.locals.com/subscribe and “Excellence in Claims Handling” at https://barryzalma.substack.com/welcome.

You can contact Mr. Zalma at https://www.zalma.com, https://www.claimschool.com, [email protected] and [email protected] . Mr. Zalma is the first recipient of the first annual Claims Magazine/ACE Legend Award.

You may find interesting the podcast “Zalma On Insurance” at https://anchor.fm/barry-zalma; you can follow Mr. Zalma on Twitter at; you should see Barry Zalma’s videos on https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCysiZklEtxZsSF9DfC0Expg/featured; or videos on https://rumble.com/zalma. Go to the Insurance Claims Library – https://zalma.com/blog/insurance-claims–library/ The last two issues of ZIFL are available at https://zalma.com/zalmas-insurance-fraud-letter-2/

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What else you may like…
Videos
Posts
September 18, 2026
Expert May Only Testify to What Experience Supports

Insurance Expert May Not Testify to Speculative and Contains Unsupported Conclusions.

Posted on September 18, 2026 by Barry Zalma

See the full video at and at https://rumble.com/v7fmifw-expert-may-only-testify-to-what-experience-supports.html

In Michele A. Over, and The Estate Of Paul R. Over v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, and State Farm Fire And Casualty Company, Civil Action No. 23-cv-02243-PAB-STV, United States District Court, D. Colorado (September 14, 2026) Michele and Paul Over sued State Farm Fire and State Farm Auto over hail-damage and stolen-vehicle claims.

The operative dispute concerned State Farm Auto’s motion to exclude or limit opinions from plaintiffs’ insurance-industry expert, Aaron Castillo. Castillo.

Law

The proponent of expert testimony must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that an expert is qualified and that the opinions are helpful, sufficiently grounded, and reliably derived and applied. Experience-based opinions must explain how the...

00:03:10
September 17, 2026
Convicted on 29 Tax-Refund-Fraud Counts

150 Months in Prison for Tax Fraud
Post 4846

Posted on September 17, 2026 by Barry Zalma

See the full video at https://lnkd.in/g8rh3JBX and https://lnkd.in/gmkdy-9C, In United States Of America v. Thomas Addaquay, Nos. 25-10609, 25-10611, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit (September 9, 2026) the Eleventh Circuit affirmed all challenged convictions, the 150-month aggregate sentence, and the challenged $4,123,474.55 restitution award.

FACTS

In United States Of America v. Thomas Addaquay, United States Of America v. Thomas Addaquay, Nos. 25-10609, 25-10611, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit (September 9, 2026) the Eleventh Circuit affirmed all challenged convictions, the 150-month aggregate sentence, and the challenged $4,123,474.55 restitution award.
FACTS

Thomas Addaquay controlled United Consolidated Accounting and Business Services (UC), nominally a check-cashing business.

The government proved a three-stage tax-refund scheme that converted the resulting refund checks into usable funds through ...

00:05:23
September 14, 2026
Court Enforces Fifth Amendment & Refuses to Compel Answers

Major Fraud Perpetrator Asserts Fifth Amendment Privilege to Avoid Prosecution

Post 5489

Posted on September 14, 2026 by Barry Zalma

Fraudster Refuses to Answer Questions About His Alleged Fraud

See the full video at https://lnkd.in/gvicAMDr and at https://lnkd.in/gvicAMDr

In Great American Insurance Co. v. Gemstone Property Management, LLC, et al., No. 23-cv-9100 (LJL), United States District Court, S.D. New York (September 8, 2026) Great American Insurance Company alleged that it was defrauded through a scheme in which Subin Associates, LLP recruited individuals to stage construction-site injuries, arranged unnecessary medical treatment and litigation funding, and pursued fraudulent personal-injury claims.

Luis Manuel Garcia Salcedo, resulted in a $6 million settlement. Non-party Jose Hernandez allegedly worked as an assistant manager at Subin, operated Hernandez Associates, and owned litigation-funding companies that shared office space with Subin and provided services to its clients.

After Great American ...

00:05:14
November 05, 2026
Convicted of Felony Fraud You Lose the Right to Vote

Payment of Fines & Completion of Probation Reinstates Right to Vote

Post 4576

Posted on November 5, 2026 by Barry Zalma

To Restore Voting Rights The Felon Must Pay Fines of $546.00

In Florida Supreme Court Mediator Ethics Advisory Committee, ETH F-26-377, No. F-26-377 (October 29, 2026) citizen unnamed and to Ron Desantis Governor, Cord Byrd the Secretary of State Florida Division of Elections provided an advisory opinion to a convicted felon about his right to vote:

To: [redacted] We received your request for an advisory opinion. You indicate that you have one or more felony convictions and request whether you are eligible to vote, including whether you have any outstanding legal financial obligations under section 98.0751, Florida Statutes, and, if so, a statement of the amount that must be paid to make you eligible to vote, and an explanation of how the amount was calculated.

The Division hereby responds to your request pursuant to its legal authority under section 106.23(2), Florida Statutes, and Florida ...

November 04, 2026
Castro Valdez Had an Available Administrative Appeal and Failed to Establish a Ground for Excusing

Administrative Review Permits the Agency to Apply its Expertise

Post 4574

In Erwin Jordan Castro Valdez v. Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, No. 26-cv-06147-BAS-JLB, United States District Court, S.D. California (October 30, 2026) Castro Valdez, a Cuban national paroled into the United States, was arrested on June 23, 2026, for alleged insurance fraud, grand theft, and making a false report to law enforcement. In his first habeas action, the district court ordered a bond hearing within fourteen days to determine whether the changed circumstances justified revoking his parole.

An Immigration Judge subsequently denied bond because of his pending state criminal case. Castro Valdez filed a second petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging that determination and requesting immediate release without first appealing to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).

LAW

According to the supplied text, § 2241 does not expressly require administrative exhaustion, but courts impose exhaustion as a prudential requirement. ...

November 03, 2026
Jury Found Prudential to be the Victim of Fraud

Insured’s Ordered to Pay Insurer for Fraud by the Insureds

Post 4573

Posted on November 3, 2026 by Barry Zalma

In The Prudential Insurance Company Of America v. Carol Gardina and George Gardina, No. 6:23-cv-1125-JSS-DCI, United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Orlando Division (October 22, 2026).

THE JURY TRIAL AND VERDICT

Plaintiff sued Defendants for numerous causes of action stemming from its allegations that Defendants fraudulently collected benefits under their long-term care insurance policies. Plaintiff's case proceeded to a nine-day jury trial, after which the jury found Defendants liable for fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and civil conspiracy.

The jury also found Defendant Carol Gardina liable to Plaintiff for $1,930,129 in compensatory damages and Defendant George Gardina liable to Plaintiff for $12,496 in compensatory damages and $20 in punitive damages. Thereafter, the court entered judgment in Plaintiff's favor and awarded Plaintiff $1,930,129 in compensatory damages from...

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