Not All Expert Testimony must be Scientifically Reliable
Post number 5284
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In Church Mutual Insurance Company, S.I. v. Chabad Of New Mexico, No. 1:24-cv-00090-MIS-SCY, United States District Court, D. New Mexico (February 10, 2026) the USDC dealt with a declaratory judgment filed by Church Mutual that it owes no duty to cover Chabad’s claims because the property was “vacant” for more than sixty consecutive days before the acts of arson, and therefore no coverage is owed pursuant to the Policy’s “Vacancy” loss condition.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Church Mutual Insurance Company, S.I. (“Church Mutual”) renewed an insurance policy for Chabad of New Mexico (“Chabad”) covering real property in Rio Rancho, New Mexico. The policy included a “Vacancy” loss condition, stating that if the building was vacant for more than 60 consecutive days prior to a loss, Church Mutual would not pay for losses caused by certain events, including vandalism.
The claims adjuster assigned to investigate the fires stated that “while the building was not actively being used, there remained sufficient contents in the structure for the Insured to continue their normal operations.”
The interpretation and construction of an insurance policy is a question of law for the Court and one that the Court performed when it ruled on the Parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of coverage concluding that Chabad’s building was not “vacant” under the unambiguous terms of the Policy and that therefore Chabad was entitled to summary judgment on the issue of coverage as to both fires. As such, the Court finds that this argument was moot.
Chabad sought to introduce expert testimony regarding insurance industry standards, customs and practices and about how Church Mutual Insurance Company deviated from those standards in its handling of the property damage claims of” Chabad. Chabad hired Stuart Setcavage who purports to be “an expert in the field of insurance industry claim handling, policy interpretation and coverage analysis.”
As to the Vacancy provision, Mr. Setcavage states: “Claim professionals are trained to know that the vacancy condition of the building combines suspension of coverage for certain perils with reduction in coverage for others . . . The approach . . . eliminates coverage only for the perils most affected by vacancy, and it reduces coverage for damage by other perils. ”
Church Mutual sought to exclude the expert testimony of S. Setcavage.
ANALYSIS/DISCUSSION:
The Court denied Church Mutual’s Corrected Motion to Exclude the testimony of S. Setcavage. The judge found that the motion did not warrant exclusion and permitted the testimony to be presented at trial.
Mr. Setcavage noted that “neither the perils of arson nor fire are specifically identified” in the Vacancy provision, and opines that “the intent of the policy was to reduce coverage by 15% for perils not specifically listed, not eliminate it altogether.” Mr. Setcavage further opined that Church Mutual is attempting to redefine ‘vacancy’ to include factors not set forth in the policy. Church Mutual now wants vacant to mean unused.
District courts evaluating the reliability of non-scientific expert testimony do not have to focus on whether the expert employed an objective standard or methodology and can instead focus on the reliability of the expert’s personal knowledge or experience.
Here, Mr. Setcavage has offered opinions that may assist the jury in deciding whether Church Mutual has engaged in bad faith insurance conduct. In fact, the claim handling or investigation is indicia of a pre-determination to deny payment for these claims. The Court was satisfied that Mr. Setcavage’s proposed expert testimony was both reliable and relevant, in that it will assist the trier of fact.
Church Mutual Insurance Company’s Corrected Motion to Exclude the Testimony of S. Setcavage, was denied.
ZALMA OPINION
Insurance claims handling expert witnesses are not scientists, do not deal with scientific or engineering realities but rather are presented to explain to a jury that actions of an insurer in dealing with a claim, were conducted within the custom and practice of the insurance industry and whether the insurer fulfilled or failed to fulfill the standards of the industry. For that reason, since the court had ruled that the insurer’s attempt to apply a vacancy condition to apply to perils not identified the court concluded the expert would help the jury understand whether the tort of bad faith was involved.
(c) 2026 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc.
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Insurance Expert May Not Testify to Speculative and Contains Unsupported Conclusions.
Posted on September 18, 2026 by Barry Zalma
See the full video at and at https://rumble.com/v7fmifw-expert-may-only-testify-to-what-experience-supports.html
In Michele A. Over, and The Estate Of Paul R. Over v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, and State Farm Fire And Casualty Company, Civil Action No. 23-cv-02243-PAB-STV, United States District Court, D. Colorado (September 14, 2026) Michele and Paul Over sued State Farm Fire and State Farm Auto over hail-damage and stolen-vehicle claims.
The operative dispute concerned State Farm Auto’s motion to exclude or limit opinions from plaintiffs’ insurance-industry expert, Aaron Castillo. Castillo.
Law
The proponent of expert testimony must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that an expert is qualified and that the opinions are helpful, sufficiently grounded, and reliably derived and applied. Experience-based opinions must explain how the...
150 Months in Prison for Tax Fraud
Post 4846
Posted on September 17, 2026 by Barry Zalma
See the full video at https://lnkd.in/g8rh3JBX and https://lnkd.in/gmkdy-9C, In United States Of America v. Thomas Addaquay, Nos. 25-10609, 25-10611, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit (September 9, 2026) the Eleventh Circuit affirmed all challenged convictions, the 150-month aggregate sentence, and the challenged $4,123,474.55 restitution award.
FACTS
In United States Of America v. Thomas Addaquay, United States Of America v. Thomas Addaquay, Nos. 25-10609, 25-10611, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit (September 9, 2026) the Eleventh Circuit affirmed all challenged convictions, the 150-month aggregate sentence, and the challenged $4,123,474.55 restitution award.
FACTS
Thomas Addaquay controlled United Consolidated Accounting and Business Services (UC), nominally a check-cashing business.
The government proved a three-stage tax-refund scheme that converted the resulting refund checks into usable funds through ...
Major Fraud Perpetrator Asserts Fifth Amendment Privilege to Avoid Prosecution
Post 5489
Posted on September 14, 2026 by Barry Zalma
Fraudster Refuses to Answer Questions About His Alleged Fraud
See the full video at https://lnkd.in/gvicAMDr and at https://lnkd.in/gvicAMDr
In Great American Insurance Co. v. Gemstone Property Management, LLC, et al., No. 23-cv-9100 (LJL), United States District Court, S.D. New York (September 8, 2026) Great American Insurance Company alleged that it was defrauded through a scheme in which Subin Associates, LLP recruited individuals to stage construction-site injuries, arranged unnecessary medical treatment and litigation funding, and pursued fraudulent personal-injury claims.
Luis Manuel Garcia Salcedo, resulted in a $6 million settlement. Non-party Jose Hernandez allegedly worked as an assistant manager at Subin, operated Hernandez Associates, and owned litigation-funding companies that shared office space with Subin and provided services to its clients.
After Great American ...
A Suit Filed Before the Claim Exists is Fatal
Post 4870
Posted on October 20, 2026 by Barry Zalma
In Louis Briggs v. Shaun Wimberly; Somerset Services, Inc.; And Wimberly & Associates, PLLC, and Louis Briggs v. Shaun Wimberly And Wimberly & Associates, PLLC Nos. 2024-CA-1471-MR, 2025-CA-1366-MR, Court of Appeals of Kentucky (October 9, 2026) Louis Briggs was arrested in 2014 after an incident with police and charged with several offenses, including third-degree assault.
Probable cause was found and an indictment was returned, but the charges were eventually dismissed. His attorney, Shaun Wimberly, then filed a federal civil rights suit for Briggs in a United States district court, which also asserted state-law claims. The district court dismissed most of the claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. Briggs blamed Wimberly for the result, fired him, and appealed to the Sixth Circuit.
While the federal appeal was pending, Briggs filed a legal malpractice action against Wimberly in the Jefferson Circuit Court. The Sixth ...
Plaintiff’s Reading of the Policy is Plaintiff’s Reasonable Allegations
Posted on October 19, 2026 by Barry Zalma
Post 4868
CLASS ACTION THAT STATES A SIMPLE CLEAR AND PLAUSIBLE CAUSE OF ACTION SURVIVES
In Sheila Marino v. Farmers New World Life Insurance Company, No. 2:25-cv-02200-JNW, United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Seattle (October 13, 2026) defendant Farmers New World Life Insurance Company’s (“FNWL”) moved to dismiss Plaintiff Sheila Marino’s putative class action involving flexible universal life insurance.
Marino filed a putative class action in King County Superior Court alleging: (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (3) violation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA).
She pleaded two theories: an “overcharge” theory and an “underpayment of interest” theory asked the Court to take judicial notice of historical Federal Funds Effective Rates.
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Pleading Standard.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a ...
Alleged Defamatory Statements Must be Of and Concerning Plaintiffs
Posted on October 16, 2026 by Barry Zalma
To Prove Defamation the Statement Must be Of and Concerning the Plaintiffs
Post 4867
In Michael Moloney and Sergio Cantu v. United Services Automobile Association, No. 04-25-00519-CV, Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District, San Antonio (October 14, 2026) Michael Moloney and Sergio Cantu appealed from the trial court’s granting of a traditional motion for summary judgment in favor of United Services Automobile Association (“USAA”) on their defamation claim.
BACKGROUND
Moloney and Cantu sued USAA for defamation, alleging that they are the principals of Informed Roofing & Restoration, LLC (“Informed Roofing”), which is primarily engaged in the residential roofing repair and replacement business, and that an employee or agent of USAA had made false and defamatory statements to the San Antonio Police Department (“SAPD”) concerning them.
Specifically, Moloney and Cantu alleged that an employee of ...
