Owner of Property Not Named as Insured Has No Standing
Post number 5280
See the video at https://lnkd.in/gVwMZnES and at https://lnkd.in/geUWJ5Sa, and at https://zalma.com/blog plus more than 5250 posts.
When Ownership in Property Changes it is Essential to Cause the Policy to Name the New Owner as Insured
In Joyce Lynn Serauskas v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., No. 25-cv-12474, United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division (February 4, 2026) in August 2024 a fire damaged a home on West 51st Street in Chicago. Joyce Lynn Serauskas filed an insurance claim with Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., under a homeowner’s policy originally issued to her mother, Estelle Bielecki, in 1978.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The policy had been automatically renewed every year with premiums paid on time, including at the time of the fire. However, Estelle Bielecki had passed away in 2010, and Serauskas had continued to reside in the home and pay premiums.
Eventually Serauskas acquired full ownership before the fire.
LEGAL ISSUES
Serauskas brought claims for breach of contract and for vexatious and unreasonable conduct under § 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code. She also asserted estoppel and equitable lien claims, arguing Liberty Mutual created a reasonable expectation of coverage by accepting premiums and issuing renewals after Estelle’s death. Liberty Mutual moved to dismiss, challenging standing and the sufficiency of Serauskas’s claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
The policy was issued to her deceased mother but Serauskas had paid premiums and lived at the property for years. Standing implicates the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Rule 12(b)(6) examines the legal sufficiency of the claims, requiring that factual allegations plausibly suggest the existence of jurisdiction and a viable claim. The court noted that standing is a fundamental requirement under Article III, focusing on whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute.
The court granted Liberty Mutual’s motion to dismiss, though some claims were dismissed without prejudice, suggesting potential for refiling if properly pleaded. The analysis centered on whether Serauskas, as someone who paid premiums and ultimately owned the property, could enforce the policy issued in her mother’s name and whether Liberty Mutual’s conduct created a reasonable expectation of coverage despite the named insured’s death.
Liberty Mutual argued that the breach of contract claim must be dismissed because Serauskas lacks standing-she is not a party to the insurance contract and therefore cannot sue for breach.
A nonparty’s right to enforce a contract is governed by state law. There is no dispute that Estelle Bielecki is the “named insured” and the home on West 51st Street is the relevant Property described in the Policy. Because she is not a named insured, Liberty Mutual argued that Serauskas lacks standing to sue. It also notes that although the Policy contains an assignment provision, at no time prior to the fire in 2024 did Liberty Mutual provide written consent for assignment of the policy.
Serauskas’s arguments in response are non-starters.
The issue is not whether Serauskas was required under the Policy to notify Liberty Mutual of her mother’s death. It’s whether she qualified under the relevant provision of the Policy as a named insured. She did not.
The motion to dismiss was granted.
ZALMA OPINION
Ms. Serauskas was ignorant of the insurance issues raised by her mother’s death. First, a homeowners policy requires the named insured to reside in the premises for insurance to apply. In addition, only an insured, as defined by the policy, can recover as a result of a loss, like a fire. Serauskas was not an insured but resided in the premises. The named insured was dead and could not reside in the premises. To avoid the problem all that Serauskas’ needed to do was amend the policy to name her as an insured. She did not do so, was not an insured, and had no rights under the policy and the person with those rights was dead.
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Insurance Expert May Not Testify to Speculative and Contains Unsupported Conclusions.
Posted on September 18, 2026 by Barry Zalma
See the full video at and at https://rumble.com/v7fmifw-expert-may-only-testify-to-what-experience-supports.html
In Michele A. Over, and The Estate Of Paul R. Over v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, and State Farm Fire And Casualty Company, Civil Action No. 23-cv-02243-PAB-STV, United States District Court, D. Colorado (September 14, 2026) Michele and Paul Over sued State Farm Fire and State Farm Auto over hail-damage and stolen-vehicle claims.
The operative dispute concerned State Farm Auto’s motion to exclude or limit opinions from plaintiffs’ insurance-industry expert, Aaron Castillo. Castillo.
Law
The proponent of expert testimony must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that an expert is qualified and that the opinions are helpful, sufficiently grounded, and reliably derived and applied. Experience-based opinions must explain how the...
150 Months in Prison for Tax Fraud
Post 4846
Posted on September 17, 2026 by Barry Zalma
See the full video at https://lnkd.in/g8rh3JBX and https://lnkd.in/gmkdy-9C, In United States Of America v. Thomas Addaquay, Nos. 25-10609, 25-10611, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit (September 9, 2026) the Eleventh Circuit affirmed all challenged convictions, the 150-month aggregate sentence, and the challenged $4,123,474.55 restitution award.
FACTS
In United States Of America v. Thomas Addaquay, United States Of America v. Thomas Addaquay, Nos. 25-10609, 25-10611, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit (September 9, 2026) the Eleventh Circuit affirmed all challenged convictions, the 150-month aggregate sentence, and the challenged $4,123,474.55 restitution award.
FACTS
Thomas Addaquay controlled United Consolidated Accounting and Business Services (UC), nominally a check-cashing business.
The government proved a three-stage tax-refund scheme that converted the resulting refund checks into usable funds through ...
Major Fraud Perpetrator Asserts Fifth Amendment Privilege to Avoid Prosecution
Post 5489
Posted on September 14, 2026 by Barry Zalma
Fraudster Refuses to Answer Questions About His Alleged Fraud
See the full video at https://lnkd.in/gvicAMDr and at https://lnkd.in/gvicAMDr
In Great American Insurance Co. v. Gemstone Property Management, LLC, et al., No. 23-cv-9100 (LJL), United States District Court, S.D. New York (September 8, 2026) Great American Insurance Company alleged that it was defrauded through a scheme in which Subin Associates, LLP recruited individuals to stage construction-site injuries, arranged unnecessary medical treatment and litigation funding, and pursued fraudulent personal-injury claims.
Luis Manuel Garcia Salcedo, resulted in a $6 million settlement. Non-party Jose Hernandez allegedly worked as an assistant manager at Subin, operated Hernandez Associates, and owned litigation-funding companies that shared office space with Subin and provided services to its clients.
After Great American ...
Is Exhaustion Required to Seek Declaratory Relief From an Excess Insurer?
Post 4578
Posted on November 9, 2026 by Barry Zalma
In Fox Paine & Company, LLC, et al. v. Twin City Fire Insurance Company et al., S287404, 593 P.3d 832, 593 P.3d 838, 346 Cal.Rptr.3d 541, Supreme Court of California, (July 27, 2026) the Supreme Court noted that Insurance is sometimes procured in a series of layers, with an insured acquiring a primary insurance policy that provides an initial layer of coverage for loss or liability and an excess insurance policy or policies that provide additional coverage in the event the underlying coverage is exhausted. Usually, the first layer of coverage must be exhausted before the excess layers are available to the insured.
Exhaustion
Fox and Paine’s investment-firm dispute generated extensive litigation and competing insurance claims. Their insurance tower consisted of a $10 million primary policy and four $10 million excess layers.
The Fox Parties alleged that insurers paid their rivals, withheld information,...
Payment of Fines & Completion of Probation Reinstates Right to Vote
Post 4576
Posted on November 5, 2026 by Barry Zalma
To Restore Voting Rights The Felon Must Pay Fines of $546.00
In Florida Supreme Court Mediator Ethics Advisory Committee, ETH F-26-377, No. F-26-377 (October 29, 2026) citizen unnamed and to Ron Desantis Governor, Cord Byrd the Secretary of State Florida Division of Elections provided an advisory opinion to a convicted felon about his right to vote:
To: [redacted] We received your request for an advisory opinion. You indicate that you have one or more felony convictions and request whether you are eligible to vote, including whether you have any outstanding legal financial obligations under section 98.0751, Florida Statutes, and, if so, a statement of the amount that must be paid to make you eligible to vote, and an explanation of how the amount was calculated.
The Division hereby responds to your request pursuant to its legal authority under section 106.23(2), Florida Statutes, and Florida ...
Administrative Review Permits the Agency to Apply its Expertise
Post 4574
In Erwin Jordan Castro Valdez v. Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, No. 26-cv-06147-BAS-JLB, United States District Court, S.D. California (October 30, 2026) Castro Valdez, a Cuban national paroled into the United States, was arrested on June 23, 2026, for alleged insurance fraud, grand theft, and making a false report to law enforcement. In his first habeas action, the district court ordered a bond hearing within fourteen days to determine whether the changed circumstances justified revoking his parole.
An Immigration Judge subsequently denied bond because of his pending state criminal case. Castro Valdez filed a second petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging that determination and requesting immediate release without first appealing to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
LAW
According to the supplied text, § 2241 does not expressly require administrative exhaustion, but courts impose exhaustion as a prudential requirement. ...
