Compassion Needed by Victims not Fraudster
Post 5083
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United States Of America v. Chad Lightfoot, No. 3:17-CR-00274, United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana, Monroe Division (May 6, 2025) the Court dealt with a Motion for Compassionate Release filed by Defendant Chad Lightfoot (“Lightfoot”). The United States of America (“the Government”) opposed the Motion.
BACKGROUND
Lightfoot is an incarcerated inmate with the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). He filed a Motion requesting compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Lightfoot alleged extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting relief based on the criteria set forth in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.
Lightfoot made false and fraudulent representations to procure funds from a federal disaster relief program. Lightfoot claimed that his residence in Monroe, Louisiana sustained damage from a flood, when in fact, Lightfoot was residing in New Orleans during the time the incident occurred. After a four-day trial, a jury convicted Lightfoot on the sole count of the Indictment.
SENTENCING
The Court sentenced Lightfoot to 71 months’ imprisonment, followed by 5 years’ supervised release. Lightfoot is expected to be released on December 5, 2025.
RELEVANT POST CONVICTION LITIGATION
On February 26, 2024, Lightfoot filed a “Motion for Compassionate Release and or Reduction of Sentence (Amendment 821) and Appointment of Counsel.”
LAW & ANALYSIS
Generally, a district court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed. However, § 3582(c)(1)(A) sets forth narrow circumstances where a court may “reduce the term of imprisonment” and “impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment.”
The Court may only grant relief when the defendant shows that
1. extraordinary and compelling reasons justify a sentence reduction;
2. such a reduction is consistent with applicable statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; and
3. early release would be consistent with the sentencing factors in § 3553(a).
Extraordinary and Compelling Criteria
Lightfoot must demonstrate that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant reducing his sentence. the Sentencing Commission set forth six specific reasons that can be considered extraordinary and compelling under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i):
1. the defendant’s medical condition;
2. defendant’s age;
3. family circumstances;
4. whether defendant has been a victim of abuse during custody;
5. other reasons that are ”similar in gravity” to reasons one through four; and
6. an extraordinarily long sentence.
Lightfoot points to his “family circumstances” as the basis for his Motion. Specifically, Lightfoot claims:
his four minor children need his financial and emotional support;
his mother is suffering from dementia; and
he is a possible organ donor candidate for his sister’s kidney transplant procedure.
Lightfoot does not meet or satisfy any of the family circumstances.
Danger to the Community and Section 3553(a)
Even if Lightfoot showed extraordinary and compelling reasons for granting relief, the analysis doesn’t end there. Lightfoot’s prior conduct speaks for itself. Lightfoot has been arrested and convicted for several crimes, including, armed robbery, simple and aggravated assault and battery, bank fraud, insurance fraud, and forgery. His last offense involved a fraudulent scheme to receive thousands of dollars from a federal disaster relief by falsely claiming that his Monroe residence sustained damage from a flood. Such offenses pose a danger to the community.
The USDC concluded that releasing Defendant would be contrary to the Sentencing Commission’s directive that courts should deny compassionate release to defendants who pose a danger to their communities because Defendant’s fraud scheme lasted over a year and caused grave financial and emotional harm to his many victims.
Lightfoot’s Motion was denied.
ZALMA OPINION
Chutzpah is defined as a person who murders his parents and seeks mercy because he is an orphan. People who commit fraud are, by definition, people with unmitigated gall. After being convicted and sentenced, Mr. Lightfoot tried to cut about a year off his sentence by claiming he needed to care for his children, mother and sick sister. However, the USDC refused because of the clear danger he presents to the people state of Louisiana. Lightfoot’s attempt to reduce his sentence was found by the USDC to be an example of chutzpah and he will serve his full sentence.
(c) 2025 Barry Zalma & ClaimSchool, Inc.
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Read the full article at https://lnkd.in/evHXiiFE and at https://zalma.com/blog.
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Post number 5368
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